

A second Parcel of

OBICTIONS

Against the taking of the

ENGAGEMENT ANSWERED.

Or the doubts which som godlie Ministers in som neighbor Counties entertained upon that Subject; as they were proposed in several Letters to, and resolved by J. D.

Whereunto is occasionally annexed a discoverie of the weaknes of the Plea of the *Cheshire* and *Lancashire* Ministers for non-subscribing.



L O N D O N,
Printed by Will. Du Gard. 1650.

A second Parcel of

OBJECTIONS

Against the Bill of the

UNION

ANSWERED.

Of the objections which some goodle Minis-
ters in some neighbor Countries contained
upon this Subject, as they are proposed in
the Bill of Union, and answered by the

Whom it is reasonably annexed a discovery of
the weakness of the Bill of the Church and Lan-
guage, and the reason of the same.



LONDON,
Printed by W. B. G. 1670.



A second Parcel of OBJECTIONS
against the taking of the ENGAGEMENT
answered;

Or, the doubts which som godlie
Ministers in som neighbor Counties en-
tertained upon that subject, as they were
proposed in several Letters to, and resol-
ved by J. D.

The first Letter.

Reverend Sir!



He scope of your late writings seem's to
bee the giving of satisfaction to such as
are scrupulous about the new Engage-
ment: Give mee leav (beeing embold-
ned therewnto by your ingenious invita-
tion, p. 29. of your Re-prop.) to ac-
quaint you with the thoughts of divers
godlie Ministers (whose names you may
have if need bee) touching your two
last pieces: and to shew you wherein they remain unsatisfied. Only
let mee premise thus much, and speak it as in the sight of God;
that although my acquaintance hath been but little with you (beeing
once only in your companie with Dr. Wells) yet I have alwaie
highly honored you in my heart, since I had any knowledg of you;

and have often said to my friends, That if I would rest upon any man's judgement living, (at least in points of this nature) it should bee upon yours: so deeply was I possessed with the persuasion both of your abilitie and integritie. And for those, whose thoughts I represent to you, I may truly saie of them, they are such as are led into their doubtings by no design, but the design of keeping a good conscience; and that the tie of conscience arising from covenants, whereby they have tied themselves to God, is the principall (if not onlie) thing that makes them tender this waie. You may therefore pleas to take notice:

1. They think that the less self-confidence, and abounding in our sens, bee used in things of so doubtful a nature, the more agreeable it is to the rule of love, and the more safe will our proceedings bee therein.

2. They think that in your whole discours on this subjectt, you take that pro concessio (and make it the chief basis and bottom of all your argumentation) namely, That the continuance of King and Lords is inconsistent with Salus Populi; (whereunto it's willingly granted other things must give place): but this is the thing altogether in question, as was otherwise determined by the major part of the Commons (when the House was full and free) who are our onlie competent judges in things of this nature.

3. They think it a sentence scarcely agreeable to the rule of charitie and Christian compassion, that those who are afraid to engage this waie (though they engage to live quietly, and obey in lawfull things) should have no protection or other benefit of law (as you seem to saie p. 22. of your Considerations) since, wherein is true tenderness of conscience, if it bee not to bee tender in those things wherein wee have to do with God, and that in the most sacred and solemn manner, viz. by Oaths and Covenants.

4. Whereas you saie in your Re-prop. p. 12. that there is no difference at all betwixt the things which the proposers themselves mention to bee the dutie of Subjects to their superiors, and the subscriptions required by present Autoritie; And yet p. 15. you say wee mean to declare by our subscriptions our approbation of, authorizing consent unto, and our obligation towards the present Establishment, (which are the principal things that the proposers suppose at, at appear's Sect. 39; And whereas your self would not have

it so much as questioned how far it doth implice an approbation of the present establishment, a ratifying consent thereto, and an obligation in all to the strengthening and promoting of it; and yet by subscribing you declare your approbation of it; they cannot see how these things are clear from contradiction and crossing one another.

5. They account it an hard censure by you, to saie that those whom nothing can satisfie in their doubts, but a clear declaration made either by the Supreme Power, or by themselves, to bee such as have no sinceritie in them, (pag. 20. of your Repropos.) since we cannot go too clearly and surely to work in acquitting our selves from the guilt arising from the violation of such oaths and promises as wee have made to God.

6. They think it no less violation of the rule of charitie, for you to saie of the proposers (though altogether unknown to them) That in their Proposals they have covered a State business and politick design with a Ministerial cloak, p. 29. (where there seem's to bee a mixture of som bitterness) then if the proposers should saie of you, that you have put forth your late Papers to pleas a prevailing partie. And if there bee a libertie to censure each other in this sort, whose integritie shall bee left untouched and unviolated?

7. They acknowledg that to bee very true, which you speak p. 21. and that even good men are too subject to admit of self-mixtures in their best actions. But they see no reason to think that your self should bee so strong as not to bee at som times subject to the like weakness: If you bee, then you know it is the dutie of the strong to bear with the infirmities of the weak: and the proprietie of love, rather to cover and conceal them, then to laie them open to their shame, when so manie are readie to rejoice in it.

To conclude, they are much afraid that the late writings on this subject, have not a little exasperated the higher Powers, and heightened the heat of their indignation against manie that are truly godlie (both Ministers and People that are tender this waie) by increasing unjust jealousies in their minds towards them, and making things appear in a worse shape then needed, and so have made the gap greater and breach wider, which had far more need to have been closed and cured. It is conceived, that you can very hardly prove those things which you suggest against the proposers, and therefore (as your self saie) in doubtful things love should judg the best: And therefore

it had been a far better office both of love to your brethren, yea, and of fidelitie to Superiors, rather to have cast on water, then to have added fuel to the flame: autoritie being alwaies apt enough to take high offence at such, who in all things agree not with it.

Sir, you cannot but know that the generalitie of the Church of Scotland have the same sense of this new Engagement with those that scruple it in England: whose judgment is not to bee sleighted. Neither is there reason for anie to bee carried on with such confidence in the mainteining of it, as to censure those who are doubtful. You cannot but know that in doubtful things, by reason of the diversity of apprehensions, there will bee likewise a differing latitude in men's consciences (even in the consciences of such as are truly pious and most sincerely conscientious) so as those things which will satisfie one, will not satisfie another that desire's satisfaction (as it hath been heretofore between the non-conformists and conformists, (though both godlie) and is still between the Independents and Presbyterians) so that in publick subscriptions it hath been thought needful things should bee as clear as the morning light. That therefore such who desire a clear satisfaction in such a business as this, that is involved with such difficulties, and perplexed with so manie oaths and pre-engagements, should bee censured for unsinceritie; is thought verie little agreeing with the rule of love and equitie.

It is therefore in all earnestness and loving humilitie desired of you, that you would laie no more load on such who already are even sinking under the burden of manie doubts and perplexities, nor give anie occasion to the hand of Autoritie to lie heavier upon them then heretofore; but rather that you would bestow sum of your strength in dealing with Superiors as well as inferiours: and that in these respects:

1. Because it is in their power (by not pressing) to eas manie that want power to eas themselves by untying the knots that pinch them; and it is no small charitie, to yield eas to a tired, troubled conscience.

2. It will bee their safetie and prosperitie not to laie heave burdens on the consciences of such as desire to keep a good conscience: such as have alwaie been their fastest friends, and constant intercessors at the Throne of Grace. A blow from a friend is far more grievous, then what come's from an enemy.

3. It will bee very agreeable to those manie promises and professions they have made to the whole Kingdom, touching their great care to use tender consciences tenderly. When the Prelatical yoke was broken, there was great hopes wee should have been troubled with no more yokes of the like nature.

4. It's conceived, that now you have a price in your hands, (by reason you have ingratiated your self with the higher Powers by the manie good offices you have don for them) you have opportunitie likewise to do som good offices for God's people, which they desire you maie have a heart to improve.

Blessed is hee that considereth or judgeth wisely of the poor (as the Geneva translation read's it) Psal. 41.1. You know who those poor ones are, even such as manie are, who are now struggling in their thoughts about the lawfulness of this new Engagement, and not able to finde out a satisfying resolution.

Thus I have been bold to commend the thoughts of my friends, together with my own thoughts, unto you, which I hope you will accept with that christian candor and meekness, which heretofore hath shined forth in all your carriage. If it pleas you to vouchsafe anie answer, though but in three lines, I shall take it as a true testimonie of your great humilitie and integritie. Thus desiring our good God still to make you a happie reconciler and peacemaker, I resign you to his mercie.

Yours in all christian love
and service.

This ninth of
Febr. 1649.

The Answer to the first Letter.

Reverend Sir!

YOur Letter dated Febr. 9. I received not till Febr. 16. on saturday about noon, and I willingly confess my self really beholding to you for the ingenuitie and freedom which you use towards mee in it, and wish that God would put it in the heart of everie one of my brethren that find themselves grieved at anie thing which they
finde

finde in me, to do as you have don. For I hope that God will never suffer mee to neglect anie admonition which shall bee given mee by anie, without a due reflection upon my self to examine my spirit in his sight, by the light which it bring's with it, or without a sollicitous care to give just satisfaction to everie one, whom I may see upon discoverie that I have offended through weakness: for hee was an Apostle that said, *In manie things wee offend all*, Jam. 3. (not excluding himself) and added, *If anie man offend not in a word, hee is a perfect man*: I am not conscious to my self of anie conceit of perfection in anie thing which I have attained; therefore I shall willingly take notice of the first rule which you laie down, *That the less self-confidence and abounding in our sens wee use in things of a doubtfull nature, the more agreeable our waie will bee to the rule of love; and the more safe will our proceedings bee.* By this rule I shall heartily desire to bee judged; and if I have failed by beeing too confident in anie thing, my heart doth much deceiv mee, if I shall ever bee ashamed to confess a fault, if made known unto mee. I shall therefore desire to know the passages wherein self-confidence doth appear, that I may bee humbled for them, and rectifie them upon a further examination of my heart.

Your second point of admonition is, *That I take that professo which is in question; and that I make that which is not granted to bee the basis and bottom of all my argumentation.* Which if I do, I confess I am out of the waie. But truly, by what you represent, it doth not yet appear to mee that I have done so: for you saie that I have pre-supposed this as the basis of all my argumentation, namely, *That the continuance of King and Lords is consistent with Salus Populi*: which to my best understanding, I am self in what I have said or meant to saie, I neither have said, nor intended to saie; and I would bee beholden to you, or those other brethren who make that observation, to let mee see the ground of that assertion in anie thing which I have said. For I will clearly profess, that I do not think that there is anie inconsistency between the *Salus Populi*, and the beeing of a King and of

Lords

Lords in a Nation; if they behave themselves not as Tyrants, to rule all at will, and without Laws: which are in the people's right to chuse and settle for themselves and their Kings; and it is their King's onelie Prerogative, and the dutie of their Lords, to see those Laws observed: for to mee it is clearly against the Law of God and nature, that anie King or Lords should bee *Magis soluti Legibus*, then anie of the meaneest Subjects; or *de jure* bee less reproveable then they are. This beeing then my cleer judgment, that Kings and Lords are officers in a National sociëtie appointed by God through men, to see Laws kept, it never came into my minde to think that their beeing in a Nation should bee inconsistent with the safetie thereof: and if you willingly grant, that all humane Constitutions or Ordinances of men, as the Apostle call's Kings, must give place to *Salus Populi*, I suppose, you and I shall verie little disagree about the Tenure of Kings and Lords; therefore when in the close of this admonition you saie, that this is altogether in question, truly I understand not how it come's to bee a question at all between us, or wherein I have given you a ground to think so; nor do I understand well what is meant by the words which follow thereupon, viz. *And was otherwise determined by the major part of the Commons (when the House was full and free) who are our onelie competent Judges in things of this nature.* I saie, I know not well what you mean by the thing which was otherwise determined; for if I dissent not from you in this, then nothing was otherwise determined; as to my sens in this matter, then what you agree to. But if you would intimate, that the House when it was (in your sens) full and free, did determine that there should bee a King and House of Lords, remaining with the House of Commons in this Nation, as a lawful Government in their joint relations, according to the fundamental constitution of the State; if this bee your meaning, fully grant it, That once it was so determined by both Houses, and by the major part of the Commons, who were your competent Judges in things of this nature. And yet now wee see it is again otherwise determined by ano-

ther partie of the same Commons, who declare themselves to bee a full and free Houſe (of which aſſertion now they are the onelie competent Judges) and according to their determination nothing is generally aſſerted, and in *Theſis*, That *Salus Populi*, and a King and Lords are inconfiſtent; but onely in *Hypotheſis*, and particularly, That at this preſent, there is an inconfiſtencie of a King and Houſe of Lords with the ſafetie of this People: which how true or falſe it is, ought not to bee diſputed, becauſe it cannot bee determined by you or mee; for it depend's upon the cognizance of circumſtance; whereof I conceiv none of our coat are competent judges, nor anie others that are in places of ſubjection; but onely thoſe that are beſt truſted with the higher Powers, and are about the management of their places of Truſt. And if it cannot bee denied, that thoſe that have made the alteration of the Government, were perſons beſt truſted with power able to do what they did, and did it in the Management of their places of truſt, according to the beſt of their underſtanding, for the ſafetie of the People, I dare not take upon mee to bee their judges, but muſt leave them to him under whom they pretend to ſtand; and muſt acknowledge that the alteration is of God, whoſe ordinarie courſe it is to do, by a minor part, and by weak means, that which a major part of the world, and the greatneſſe of the ſtrength thereof, is not able to do. And if I perceiv that a matter is clearly determined by thoſe whom hee hath employed, and who are in power to manage publick affairs by their places; although it may bee carried contrarie to my private ſenſe and expectation, yet I ſee no warrant for mee to take upon mee to make any other determination of the matter in my thoughts, then God hath don by them who have the management of his Power; nor can I ſee how it is lawful for anie man who cannot bring his thoughts to cloſe with that which hath been don by others, under whoſe protection hee is obliged to live, to reſuſe to do things in themſelves lawful, juſt, and undeniably tending to Common ſafetie, onely upon this account, becauſe ſuch things are commanded by men, whom they judg to have don

don that which is amiss, and beyond the line of their power. If they who presume to judge so, were by anie right of God or men made judges of their actions, or able to call them to an account thereof before competent judges; or in a condition to stand free, and in no need of their protection, something, as I conceive, might be said for their practice: but when men can pretend to nothing of all this, but are meer Subjects, and under a Power which undoubtedly is Supreme over them; under a power in full possession of all places of trust about them, and in a capacitie to manage the same, for the good of those that do well, and for the punishment of those that do evil; Now, I saie, for men, when things are so, to stand out and to resist such powers, not in things of an unlawful, but of a most commendable, lawful, and necessarie nature in themselves, and to think to be obliged to do so for conscience sake, is to mee I confess, an extreme great Paradox in the profession of Christianitie, as it is an impartial and conscionable walking before God in conformitie to his will. And if this is not the present case wherein some Ministers do stand in opposition to the present Powers, I would be glad to be rectified; and you will do mee a favor to shew mee wherein I do mistake either the publick or their private case in this matter.

The third matter of admonition is: That I seem not to deal charitably and compassionately with those who through tendernes of conscience, in reference to Oaths and Covenants, are afraid to engage this waie (*though they engage to live quietly and obey in lawful things*) by an owning of the Autoritie; and this uncharitableness you charge upon mee from my expressions in pag. 21. of my *Considerations*, where I seem to saie, That such should have no protection or other benefit of Law. If I have said so of such persons, and to the end that they should be deprived of protection, and of the benefit of equal justice; I confess it would be somewhat rigorous and inconsistent with the spirit of compassion and charitie. I am sure it was not in my design to deprive any tender conscience of anie equitable favor which

may bee shewed unto them, nay I have professedly and sincerely engaged my self, to use all my interest in those that are in places of power, to procure this unto them, as you may see more at large in the Reproposals, pag. 18. and 19. In the Paragraphs, which in the margent are marked for an Answer to the seventh and eight *Self*. of the Proposals: and as I there have professed, so I have hitherto uprightly endeavoured; but as for that which you alledg out of the Considerations, pag. 22. of the second and third Edition, (for in the first Edition, it is page 24.) I shall desire you to consider the matter and scope of that which I saie in that place; and if then you look upon the principle, which I had before (in page 16. of the same Editions) as a ground of Justice in this Case, perhaps you will see cause to excuse mee from the uncharitableness, which you charge upon mee, as towards tender Consciences; for there I speak concerning an objection against the subscribing of the Engagement, taken from the apprehension of offending godlie people by subscribing of it; my scope is to answer that Objection upon this presupposal, that, hee who take's it, is not, as to his own Conscience, scrupled at the taking of the Engagement; but is to bee swaied meerly by his consideration of others: here then to such a one I saie, that *ceteris paribus* (for this is expressly supposed in the proposal of the Case) there is more cause to apprehend a danger of offence in not subscribing, then in subscribing; becaus there are more offences (even three to one) in the balance, in case of not subscribing: for here I have cause as well as there to apprehend the offence, not onely of manie godlie brethren, but also of Superiors, and of my self in point of safetie; and these two last offences I join in this, that the Magistrate to whom I refuse to give an assurance of my fidelitie, may take that refusal, as a just cause given him to denie mee necessarie protection and safetie. For I suppose that the Rule is without all exception, that *Protectio trahit Allegiantiam*; & *vice versa Allegiantia Protectionem* & *è contra*: now whether this bee the same case which you charge upon mee, I shall leav it to your second thoughts

thoughts to consider ; for here I presuppose my self not at all scrupled in my Conscience, but to bee swaied by meer outward considerations of dangers : and that amongst other dangers I might justly apprehend this ; that if I will not shew my self faithfull to the Magistrate , who is over mee , I may fear to bee deprived of the benefit which otherwise I might reap from his office which is necessarie protection.

As for the seeming Contradiction mentioned in your fourth exception , you will easily of your self reconcile it, and perceiv your mistake, if you construe my words right, and leav not out the additional claus, put in of purpose to limit the approbation , the ratifying Consent and the obligation towards the present establishment , which I mean to declare by my subscription ; the claus which you have left out in your quotation of my words (which make's them seem to you contradictorie to themselves) is this ; *But thus far onely as I have said.* Construe then the whole period by a little transposition of their words in their order , thus, *I mean to declare, by my Subscription, my approbation of my ratifying consent unto , and my obligation towards the present establishment ; but onely thus far as have said. viz.* in the three paragraphs immediately going before, wherein I limit in the first, the approbation, in the second, the ratifying consent, and in the third, the obligation towards the establishment : to shew, that although I think not my self bound up by my subscription of the engagement , to the particulars mentioned in the Proposals , which are said to bee different from the Duties , which Subjects owe to Superiors ; yet I am willing to acknowledg som kinde of approbation of ratifying consent , and of obligation to the establishment included in the subscription ; viz. such as is agreeable to those duties, and such as I formerly had described, although then I will not grant, that the subscription to the words of the engagement doth imploie those Consequences , whereunto the Proposers would strain them , which they saie are opposite to their Oaths and Covenants : yet I refuse not to admit of som other Conse-

quences which I limit, and declare to bee consistent with the Oaths and Covenants ; the particulars inferred upon the Subscription by the Proposers, I saie, are things which go beyond a clear and known dutie ; and I conceiv, that the words of the Engagement give no ground to interpret the Act of Subscription so ; but that I may notwithstanding this rejection of those particulars, infer other particulars of the same kinde , agreeable unto a Dutie upon the same Act of Subscription , is nothing of Contradiction, as to my understanding , nor I hope will bee to yours when you shall consider better of it ; and shall not leav out the adversative particle, and the clauf which refer you to the limitation, which I think should bee heeded about those inferences.

The fifth thing which you offer, is the hard censure of want of sinceritie, you think is pronounced against all those, that can *acquiesce* in nothing ; but in such a Declaration, as shall bee made either by themselves, or their Superiors to their content ; but if you look well to my words, you will finde also here a cleer mistake of my meaning ; for my aim is not to speak of all those that have anie doubts or scruples about this busines ; as if none of them were sincere , that will or cannot *acquiesce* in anie thing else but in such a Declaration ; I saie, my words speak not indefinitely of all such ; but they express onely these proposers. For I saie distinctly , that in the proposers aim will appear no sinceritie in reference to these Proposals , if there is nothing, but this that will content them ; becauf in their Proposals they seem by offering at a Treatie , and by desiring to have matters of doubt debated, and reconciled, to seek a rational waie of satisfaction to themselves. Now saie I, when this waie shall bee offered to them, and entered upon , if they then will not follow it *ingenuously* ; but will stand peremptorily upon their own preconceived terms , and agree to nothing, but what they themselves have fancied, must bee declared ; In this case I saie it is evident , that the aim of the Proposers in the matter of their proposals , is not sincere towards the procurement of a reconciliation

conciliation, and a just waie of satisfaction, which they seem to desire; if you observ then that you mistake the Case by your not heeding the particular Subject whereof I speak, and the presupposals which I laie as the ground of that Censure; I suppose you will absolv mee from uncharitableness in this matter; for truly I believ manie to bee sincerely scrupled; and yet so weak that without making or receiving a Declaration in their own terms, they cannot bee satisfied; nay, I have met with som such. God forbid, then I should condemn them all for this, to have no sinceritie in their scruples; but if men make proposals of waies to have their Scruples taken away, and then will not at all observ the same; but without all rational and ingenuous proceeding will peremptorily prescribe their own terms to others; I think it no uncharitableness to saie, that such men in making such proposals have no sinceritie, and that this is my meaning in that passage; if you look over it again, I make no doubt you will finde it to bee so.

The sixth Admonition doth compare that which I saie of the Proposers, in reference to the continuance of their Proposals, page 29. with what they might saie of mee in reference to my late papers; as for the expressions which I have used in that place, I shall not stand to justify them; I shall rather confess that they should have been spared, or otherwise delivered; for when I look upon them, and compare them with the design which I had in that last Section, I finde that I am carried further thereby then I did purpose to proceed; for my purpose in the later part of that Section, was not directly to charge the proposers with anie politick design, but onely to let them see, as by waie of Admonition, how far both the matter and the contrivance of the proposals might bee liable to such an interpretation; if anie would give waie to suspiciouness, which I do iteratively profess my self to bee free from, and through charitie unwilling to entertain: yet upon the supposal, that it is possible som such thing might bee in the minde of som of the Proposers, I would shew the waie how even in that Case they might receiv satisfaction; but the expressions

expressions which you have noted ; are I perceiv more then this design come's to ; for they rise up to a positive, and direct charge of that whereof I intended onely to give by waie of supposition, a warning, as of that which possibly might bee. Thus I observ by my self, that when our spirits dwell upon objects of evil surmises, although it maie bee for a good and harmles aim, yet they may easily bee heated above their just measure, and lose their waie towards the end of edification, which cannot bee followed otherwise then in the Spirit of Love. As for my papers, if anie will examine them, so as to finde out the arguments, by which it maie bee probably suspected, that my aim is rather to pleas a prevailing partie, then to advance Peace and Truth in righteousness towards all, without partialitie, I shall not take it ill at his hands ; but rather thank him, and blessing God for his brotherlie care, trie my heart, and judg my thoughts by the occasion thereof, which is all that I would have the proposers do, about the matter whereof I intended to give them warning.

As for the last matter, which you mention out of
21. of the Reproposals, that even good men are too subject to admit of self-mixtures in their best actions ; and that I am not to bee exempted from this weakness, no more then others ; I shall freely confess it, to bee a truth, and declare moreover, that when I wrote that period of the discours, I was not without that verie consideration of my self ; and therefore I did set it down the rather to bee a Caution for my self ; least I might neglect the observation of mine own spirit, and courf in these matters wherewith I have begun to meddle, which I declare to meddle withal for this onelie purpose ; that I maie hold forth the waie, how to seek impartially peace by a rule, and to follow holiness with all men, without which no man shall see the Lord. I thank you then for putting mee in minde of this my condition, and hope that God will enable mee to observ also the rest of that, which you suggest in the close of this admonition.

To that which you add in shutting up these matters
which

which you have represented; I shall not replie much, onely should bee sorrie, that those fears, you speak of, should have anie *fundamentum in re*, more then in the tenderness of your fear: I can truly saie, that my labors, according to the best of my skill, do tend to prevent that, which maie heighten the heat of the Magistrate's indignation against the truly godlie, by setting before them the Rules of an unblameable walking, and by discovering the dangers of a deviation from the same; therefore to let them see the faults, in which som manifestly are taken, and which may bring guilt upon all, that they may avoid, prevent, and rectifie the same, is no unfriendlie office; nor can the discoverie of failings, which sheweth the Cause with the Cure, make anie breaches wider, but I conceive that a thorow-searching is the onelie sound waie of healing, and closing of our wounds. I can saie with a good conscience, that I have all along endeavored, upon all occasions, to cast water upon the heats of both sides, lest they might break out into a flame; and that I have solicited, and will sollicite a moderation towards tender Consciences with the best of my industrie: but the violence of som tumultuously-clamorous spirits spoil's all.

The Paragraph which begin's with a consideration of the generalitie of the Church of *Scotland*; and end's with a second complaint of my censuring all with unsinceritie, that take not the Engagement, is either assented unto for the main, or hath been rectified in that, wherein the mistake lies by that which hath been said heretofore; onely this I would have observed, that although I will not slight the judgment of anie Church, but think reverently of all, yet, that the general opinion of no Church, far less of a forreign Church ought so to bee regarded, as to swaie anie man's judgment concerning the Civil Sanctions of anie State in outward matters: for in such Cases everie mans Reason, and the Relations under which hee live's, must guid his Conscience to the knowledg of his Dutie; and what ever is don upon anie other consideration, or implicit concurrence with the generalitie of others,

C

doth

doth ordinarily become a snare to the Conscience.

Lastly, the Arguments which you use, to perswade mee not to laie anie more load on those, who are already sinking under the burden of doubts and perplexities, I do consider as true motives to that dutie which you press upon mee, whereunto, by God's grace I purpose not to bee wanting henceforth, although I am not yet made to see, that heretofore I have been guiltie of that Charge, which this exhortation doth presuppose mee liable unto: but I can easily, without trouble of minde, God bee thanked, bear with more then such surmises, and Censures amount unto; if I can but gain thereby an unprejudicate hearing of that, which hereafter I may saie towards the easing of those that are burdened with the troubles outwardly, and doubts inwardly, which they occasion to themselves, by walking either without, or contrarie to a Rule; for give mee leav to saie the truth, that in the disquirie of these things which are agitated I pretend; truly I intend, and really endeavor to think nothing; far less to saie, or act anie thing without a clear rule; and if anie time I can give you no account of that, which I saie or do, by a Rule which hath led my thoughts to bring forth those speeches and actions, I hope I shall bee assisted with grace, patiently to bear the blame which I shall deserv for so doing; I give you therefore free leav to call mee to an account; for I know I must answer one daie at a greater tribunal then yours, and I count it a small matter to bee judged by men; it doth not trouble mee at all; yet I shall never despise the judgment of anie that may reflect upon mee; for I conceive, that God doth speak unto mee by everie one who is conscionable, and take's notice of mee, that I maie bee the more solicitous to approve my waie unto him; As I therefore am very willing to bear the word of the exhortation in the dutie, and motives which you laie before mee; so I shall intreat you to do the like, in that which I shall briefly represent unto you. First, let mee intreat those who desire the hand of autoritie not to bee heavier upon them, then as yet it hath been (for as yet I know

know of nothing don to anie) not to provoke Autoritie, but to diswade those, that set themselves to incense the people against their rulers in their pulpits; one turbulent spirit in this waie will procure more wrath to all, then ten intercessors can allay; for such men make charitable intercessors ashamed to open their mouth towards the Magistrate, seeing they are manifestly seditious. Can a Magistrate bee perswaded to suffer himself to bee trampled upon? Moderate the fierce non-subscribers in the Citie and Countrey from being injurious, and I am confident God will cause them to finde a reciprocation of love from Autoritie. Secondly, let those who are not turbulent, and finde themselves burdened, and pinched with straits, bee entreated to condescend to the use of conscionable, and rational means of easing themselves, which by aimable Treaties and Conferences rightly ordered may bee brought to pass; and what averfness hath been hitherto in som, against this waie of finding ease (though they have been begged to it) I am loath to relate: but if it had been duly entertained, I am sure mistakes might have been rectified, which have heightened men's spirits, and brought us to extremities.

You maie perceiv, that my heart is enlarged towards you for your candor; the Lord grant us the conduct of his spirit, to make use of each other's good inclinations to allay heats and jealousies; whereunto, although I have offered my self with all the candor and humilitie that I could imagine, to bee required of God, or acceptable unto men; yet I have not been able to obtain anie reciprocation from anie of the Brethren here in London, who differ in judgment about the present Engagement; not so much at one meeting, to bee able to speak together, though with much earnestness desired by mee, and whether the iniquitie (as I conceiv) of this and som other unchristian usages from the brethren, hath not a litle distempered mee, when I wrote the last piece, whereat you are now offended, I cannot well tell; but when I call my self to an account of ym thoughts, it seem's som such leaven did lie

then at the bottom, and was stirred to a paroxism of fermentation which brought up som froth: but God is able to turn all to the best, if wee despise not one anothers admonitions, but receive them as in his presence, and give them as in the name of Christ in his love: if therefore you will let mee hear from you again, and let the other Brethren, whom I am sorrie to have offended, for want of due consideration of all tempers, know, what I have said for their and your satisfaction, you will oblige mee in the bowels of Christ, more and more to approve my self,

Westminster
Febr. 21.
Anno 1643^o.

Sir,

Your faithful and affectionate
Servant for the Gospel of
Peace and Truth

JOHN DURIE

The second Letter.

Reverend Sir!

I Return you manie thanks, for your pains and patience, in seeking to give satisfaction to the doubts propounded, in the paper I directed to you, I acquainted som of my godlie friends with it, who, though they bee yet unsatisfied touching the main question; yet most of them are fully satisfied touching your own candor and integritie, and do now think, that which you did by your writings, was don upon conscientious grounds, or not to serv the times. I will not bee so uncivil or unthankful, as to trouble you now, with anie tedious replie, (though much might bee said) but onely acquaint you with som scruples, as still do pinch sum pious minds, who would bee glad, if they could meet with anie help for the right clearing of them.

First, they do not fully apprehend what you mean, by that known dutie which you often urge; if it bee, that wee engage to
live

live quietly & make no disturbance this hath been often offered, but will not satisfie. If it bee to submit to the higher powers, because they are of God : you know a thing may bee said to bee of God two waies, namely, either in regard of his providence, or of his precept. Now the difficult is, whether providence alone may bee the rule of own actions, or approbation of other men's : if it may, then wee may approve of Absolon's incest, because God saith hee did it, 2 Sam. 12. 12. And so all evil actions of evil men are guided by his providence : If precept bee needful, they cannot see how the present higher powers are of God : because they were not called of God ; but have chosen and set up themselves in these places ; for however some of them were at first chosen for other purposes (as to contribute their help in making Laws, and seeing the Laws well executed) yet they were never chosen to bee the supreme power of the Nation. So that this new Government being neither grounded upon the old Law of the Nation, nor anie new agreement of their representations (the greatest part of them being either by violence withheld, or deterred from coming) this make's it difficult to discern how the higher powers may bee said to bee of God.

Secondly, they think that Oaths to God do oblige not onely for the present, but for the future, according to the sense wherein they were both imposed and taken : but it was neither the intention of the imposers, nor their's when they took them, that kinglie Government should bee taken away, or that the present King and his posteritie should bee deprived of it, but the quite contrarie; for they did swear that they would bee drawn by no power on earth from their allegiance to them. Neither will the King's miscarriage bee a sufficient ground to absolve them, from their Oath of Allegiance to him and his ; because the Oath was absolute, not conditional. Besides, look how God command's obedience. So they did swear obedience ; but all the commands of obedience to higher powers, both in Rom. 13. and in other places, are absolute, and not upon condition of their good carriage. In like manner, as bee command's servants to bee subject to their masters : not onely to those who were good and gentle, but to those who were froward, and who did them wrong, 1 Pet. 2. 18. Neither would there bee anie place left for suffering, either by Subjects or servants, if obedience were onely conditional.

Thirdly, They think that though they bee not competent judges of State matters, yet they are competent judges of their own actions (for which they must give an account to God, and they know whatever they shall do doubtfully, they do sinfully (for whatever is not of faith is sin) and the owning of the present power as if God is doubtful to them, (at least) upon the grounds before mentioned. Besides, by subscribing, they do not onely own the present power, but also the imposing of the Engagement (if not directly, yet indirectly) which they cannot see how it agrees with the rule that require's higher powers, should bee a terror to the evil, not to the good, as by this means they are.

Fourthly, for matter of offence, they think those whom the Apostle bid's us take heed not to offend, are the weak breidren, now bee is a weak brother who think's a thing to bee a thing unlawful (suppose it bee lawful) because it seem's to bee against som rule of the word (as this Engagement seem's to bee against the rule, touching oaths and promises, that they should bee kept though to our own hindrance. And thus the refusers onely, not the imposers, or those who have already taken it, are to bee accounted weak Breidren.

Fifthly, for the judgment of the Church of Scotland, or other Divines, they think, that in clear evident truths, any humane judgment dissenting, is not much to bee regarded, but that in difficult, doubtful things the spirits of the Prophets ought to bee subject to the Prophets, els wee shall overthrow all use of Synods, and follow the trail of Enthusiasts, and such as think themselves guided by an infallible spirit. Thus I have been bold to open the doubts of som good men unto you, hoping you will entertein them with som secrecie, and the like spirit of love and meekness as before, and at your convenient leisure you will not refuse to yield them a little further help. Our good God guid us so in all our thoughts and actions, that wee may neither do, nor think any thing that may bee displeasing to him.

March this 25.

Yours in the best bond.

1650.

*The Answer to the second Letter.**Reverend Sir !*

Y^Esterday's late coming home, I found yours of the 25th of March; whereby I perceived that mine was com'n safe to your hands; and that you make a charitable construction of the things which I did write unto you; which is no final refreshment unto my spirit, in the midst of these heats wherein wee are fallen, which God hath sent for our trial; and which will bee a great advantage to the purifying of our souls, if wee beave our selves orderly therein. As for the scruples which you are pleased to acquaint mee withall, that som help may bee supplied for the clearing thereof; although they do not stumble mee, but mee think's I see light enough through them; yet I cannot saie that they are not to bee counted scruples; or that they are easily to bee cleared, for although to mee they are no great difficulties; yet I conceiv to others they may bee, who reflect not upon matters by such principles as I do; and with those considerations which I take up: nor is it in the power of anie man, to make another capable of his Principles and Considerations; but God alone is able to do it; and all that wee can bee helpful to one another in, is to offer to one another so much light as wee have received; and if wee offer it in love, without partialitie, and with a true meaning to advance Righteousness and Holiness, it may, by God's blessing, become useful unto Edification; chiefly, if wee strive for one another towards God with our prayers, that wee may become helpers of each other's joie, through the grace which hee bestoweth upon us, to profit withall. I shall therefore, not undertake to resolv these scruples; for that would bee presumption, God alone can do it; but I shall humbly offer to those pious mindes, that are scrupled, my light; with all truth and sinceritie, as it is in my heart; praying to God, that if it bee from his spirit, it may so appear to them, as to clear their understandings from mistakes.

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The first scruple you mention, is concerning my expression, what I mean by *that known dutie*, which I often urge. I wish you had pointed out a place or two, that I might have been able to speak more directly to your satisfaction, then now I can do; perhaps, I shall saie therefore, that, till I bee told, where that expression is used (for I cannot readily light upon it, having cursorily look't upon the considerations) I think that I have meant throughout, nothing elf, but a *seeking of the Peace and welfare of the Societie wherein wee live*; for I think it is a known dutie in Christianitie, that wee should serv one another through love for our good; and not bee taken off from this course, so far as others are capable to receive good from us, notwithstanding the evil which may bee in them, the dutie which the Apostle mention's, *Phil. 2. 14. 15, 16.* is that, which I would have all men, but chiefly Ministers in these times to laie to heart: and you have the third, or fourth Edition of the Considerations, you will see at the end of it, the extract of a Letter; and my Answer thereunto, which containeth that dutie, which I conceive to bee clear, and known to all, who will look upon the Engagement in the obvious sense thereof.

By this you see, that I mean not onely a passive, but an active dutifulness, in things good and lawfull under the present powers, let them bee what they will; as for that which you scruple, to submit to the powers, *because they are of God*, as if that reason were not sufficient, *because* things may bee said to bee of God, either Prudentially, or Preceptively; now *Providence alone* (saie you) *is not the rule of our own actions, or approbation of other men's.* I confess this to bee so. But yet I finde, that the Apostle's reason, why hee command's all Christians to bee subject to higher powers, to bee none other but this; *viz. Because there is no power but of God; and because the powers that bee, are ordained of God; Rom. 13. 1.* So that the exception which you make seem's to mee, to bee directly against the Apostle's reasoning, which I suppose you intended not to contradict: and if the Romane Christians under Nero would have disobeyed

disobeyed lawful and Moral Commands, wherein the Apostle onely bid's them submit, they might have made your exception against his beeing of God, as fully as this is made against the present powers over us. If then the scruple strikes rather at the force of the Apostle's Argument, then at anie thing elf, I think, I am bound to vindicate his reasoning from the force of the doubt; which may be done thus; that God's appointment of a power over us, is a just cause to oblige us to submission thereunto, whether hee doth it Providentially or Preceptively; or both waies: I saie that in things lawful and good, Submission is due, because the power in place is of God; and hee that resist's it, resist's God's ordinance, saith the Apostle. But you will saie, if it bee onely providentially of God, so was *Abse- lom's* incest, and is no rule, either to warrant mine own, or for mee to approve other's mens actions? to this I saie; it is true, when you have a precept to walk by, you must not make God's acts of Providence over you a rule, to warrant anie designs which contradict the precepts, which are given you to walk by; but when things are to be look't upon by you; not as your own, or other men's Actions; but as determined events, which God hath appointed to fall out, in a way of Justice and Judgment; then you ought not to set your self against the same, but in things lawful ought to approve the same; so of *Abse- lom's* incest, wee must saie that God's providence ordered it for judgment over *David*, for a punishment of his Adulterie; and in that respect it was good; but as it was the effect of *Ahitophel's* wicked Policie to make matters desperate, and a satisfying of *Abse- lom's* lust; and a dishonor to his Father, and a shameless act, it was evil, and highly to be condemned; thus in the events of things befallen to us, which are the changes of powers over us; first the King, then the Parliament, then the Armie; and now again the Parliament; these events in themselves are neither good nor evil to us, as God hath brought them about, and ordered their succession for judgment, they were all good; and everie power in it's own time was to be sub-

mitted unto, by those that were under it, because it was of God for the time over them, and if in things lawful they resisted it: they did resist the ordinance of God, & might justly bee brought under condemnation by it; but each of these powers, as they might bee in the persons of unjust men, who by subtiltie or violence (as *Abfalom* and *Achitophel* did) thrust out others of the possession of their places to attain their ends; in this respect they were evil; and as men contrarie in their walking to the will of God, they must not bee approved of: that is to saie, their ambition, fraud, violent practices, &c. are not to bee approved of: Nevertheless, if God's Providence order it so, that they bee set up as the higher power; I suppose they are to bee look't upon as ordained by God, to that place, and obeyed in things good and lawful: their unlawful coming to their places, after that they have gotten full possession, doth not absolv anie private soul from the obligation of beeing subject, and obedient in things good and lawful. Thus Providence, as to events become's a Rule to oblige us, to do things for our selvs good and lawful; and to approve of the same in others.

You saie, if precept bee needful, they cannot see how the present powers are of God: because they were not called of God: but have chosen and set up themselves. To this I saie, that certainly precept is needful for everie man to walk by in all his actions, and what hee doth without the warrant of a Rule, is don sinfully: but yet I must add this, that it doth not follow, that if the powers which are in place, are not so com to their place, that I can see that they are called by God to it, according to a precept, that therefore I must, or may think they are not of God; for although their Calling, or coming to their place is not to mee clear, to bee conformable to a precept; yet it may bee so to themselves, and to others; and I am not to bee a Judge in things of that nature; but I suppose that it is cleerly contrarie to all Rule and Precept, that which they have don to com to their places; and that not I onely, but all men, and they themselves will confesse it; and saie as *Cesar* did; *Si violen-*
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dom est jure, regnandi causa violandum est; in ceteris pietatem colito. Suppose (I saie) this to bee so; shall I therefore saie, that they are not the present power, when I see them actually in full possession of the place of all power over mee? or shall I saie that they are not of God; when I hear the Apostle saying clearly, without anie limitation in the negative, first, *there is no power; but of God;* and then in the affirmative; *the powers that bee, are ordained of God:* all powers then are of God one waie or other; and beeing of him, I must not resist, but submit in things lawful. Look upon Mr Perkins in his Treatise of Callings, where hee speak's of Christ, and the Apostles submitting themselves to the powers, that then were in and over Judea; and Calvin. *Justit. lib. 4. c. 20. parag. 28.* speaking of Nebuchadnezar, whom hee set's up as a precedent of an usurped power to bee obeyed; hee hath these words, *observandum est quâ ratione ipsam Dominus stabilit. Detuli, inquit, Nebuchadnezarî Regnum; quare servite illi & vivite; cuicumque ergo delatum fuisse regnum constabit, ei serviendum esse nò dubitemus, atque simulat in Regium fastigium quempiam evehit Dominus; testatam nobis facit suam voluntatem, quod regnare illum velit, &c.*

Touching the calling of these men to their places; and what the nature of their place is; how far they are authorized ordinarily, or extraordinarily to make Laws, or see them executed; and whether by their choise they bee made the supreme power or no, is not a thing of everie private man's cognizance, so as to bee bound to determine it; and according to his private opinion, to bee obliged to act, or not to act for Conscience sake with them, or against them: I saie, to mee such considerations are heterogeneous to my calling, and whatever I think of them, and of their calling to their places, that is not material, as to the point of dutie, which I owe them, as beeing in full possession of the government. As for themselves, they think their calling doth bear them out in everie thing which they have don; and I finde not that my calling doth bear mee out to argue, as som do, the matter against them: but if it may bee a satisfaction to you, or

to others, I shall bee willing to let you know more at large, what they saie for themselves in these particulars, which truly I know not how anie bodie can well answer; but whether their allegations can bee answered or not, it is not further heeded by mee, then may serv to give others som insight into that, which they seem rationally to alledg for themselves.

Thus I have told you my sens of your first scruple; the second is concerning Oaths. The promissorie Oaths which men make one to another, are obliging, or not obliging, according to the possibilitie and lawfulness of the intentions of those, that impose and take them; and I conceiv, the taker of an Oath is no further obliged to the intention of the imposer, then either is clearly expressed by him in the words of the oath; or in som previous, or subsequent Declaration, assented unto by the taker; or then the taker doth declare himself to bee obliged thereunto: therefore to prevent mistakes, I did for mine own part, both in the national Covenant, and in this Engagement declare my sens and intention in taking them; which beeing allowed, I finde my self obliged thereto, now if it fall out, that the imposer's intention doth alter (as upon good and valid grounds men's intentions may bee altered) from what it was at first (for if the thing intended, which was once lawful and possible, by change of circumstances becom's vnlawful, and impossible; and this bee made known by the imposer of the oath to him that take's it,) then the Question must bee, whether in such case the taker is not absolved from his obligation? there bee manie things in the National Covenant of different natures; som are by circumstances changeable, som altogether unchangeable, the Relation which the two Nations have each to other; if either of the Nations break it (as it is in the power of all Rulers, to break, or keep entire friendlie relations with their neighbor Nations) how far the other is bound to keep it, I think it not difficult to bee determined, friends are relatives; and I can bee no longer in a relation of friendship to anie, then hee will

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own friendship with mee; if he break his Covenant therefore, and make himself an enemy to mee, I am not bound any longer by the tie of that Covenant to be his friend: yet other ties of an higher nature may be upon mee, to keep mee from being his enemy: for there is a mid'st between friendship, and hostility; and if the Rulers of the State, wherein I live, bring mee under a National relation with a neighbor Nation, to be in friendship with it at one time; and at another time bring mee to contrary relation towards it; I conceive that I am concluded by what they do either way; and that in such a case the breach of Covenant doth lie at their door, and not at mine, if I in my place have been careful not to give occasion thereunto, and thus I conceive all other actions of a publick nature, that I am concluded therein; to stand under the Relations, which those that manage the same bring upon one thereby, as to outward matters: though not as to a professed concurrence of my intentions with them, further then they expressly call mee thereunto, and I expressly declare my concurrence in that way, and when I have declared my intentions, then so far as I declare them, and as they remain possible and lawful by mee, to be prosecuted in my way; I am bound to intend them; and I conceive, that they are not to be counted longer possible, nor lawful for mee to be prosecuted in my way; then they are consistent with the main and fundamental Duties of my calling and place, as I am a Christian, and as I am a Subject and a profitable member to the Common-wealth wherein I live; for all particular obligations, whether confirmed by oaths, or otherwise, are perpetually subordinate in their nature, and presupposed by a *tacit* condition to be consistent with these, or otherwise to be *ipso facto* void. By these general Rules, and maxims concerning promissorie oaths between man and man, in matters of publick concernment; wherein, I by my place am to be concluded by others that are over mee; I think my self free from perjury, if a change fall out therein, so as to make mee incapable to prosecute the intentions once

sincerely taken up; for the intention of the taker of an oath being constant, and sincere to that which hee hath promised, according to the circumstances of matters which then were in being, when the promise was made, doth absolve him before God, and his own conscience, from perjury; for hee will profess himself alwaies bound to prosecute the same intention, and will endeavor it to the utmost of his abilitie, so long as those circumstances last, which make the intention lawful and possible; but if the circumstances which made his intention lawful at first, bee afterward altered so, that the intention doth become unlawful, if prosecuted under those circumstances; then it is no breach of promise in him, if hee doth not prosecute his first intention; for it is not lawful so to intend the prosecution of anie outward humane business; as to oblige our selves, in what cases and circumstances soever to follow; Conscience can bee obliged to follow nothing so absolutely, but the will of God; and although no condition bee expressed in promissorie oaths when they are taken, yet in the verie nature of them, the conditions which I have mentioned are implied, and need never to be mentioned: if you will now applie these positions to your second scruple, and reflect upon the intentions, which then were taken up towards the King's Person and Autoritie, in the circumstances then were; and the obligation in private persons, such as wee are, to prosecute them as circumstances now are, you will perhaps finde light to ease you of your scruple in this matter. For I shall for mine own part declare this; that, if things were now as formerly they were, when the Covenant was offered, I would finde my self obliged to prosecute the effect thereof, in reference to the King now, as then I was bound to do; but things being so altered, that there is no King in being; but another Government over mee, I am absolved from the former relation, by those that manage publick affairs, and obliged to intend the duties of a true Christian, and good Subject, under the present relations wherein God hath set mee. As for those that have taken away that object of my former Allegiance, which

which went under the name of a King, and brought upon mee the necessitie of this change of intention, by their acting in publick affairs; I am none of their judges, but must leav them to him, to whom they are accountable of their Administrations; if they in making the change did according to that, which they thought in conscience to bee their dutie, they will fare the better for it in the end: but if they had another aim, then to discharge their conscience in their dutie, it will bee worf with them; and this is all that I am bound to saie for them, as to this in general.

Now the particulars of your Scruple on this Subject run's out upon the facts of other men (which are not your Guilt) to shew the guilt which they seem to have incurred by altering the government from Monarchie to Democracie: for you saie that they swore never to bee drawn by anie power on earth from their Allegiance to the King and his Posteritie; and that their intention was not to deprive, but to preserv the King and his Posteritie in their government. I confesse it was so; and yet you see that the relation once intended to bee mainteined towards him and his Posteritie is altered; and if you ask them the Cause, they will tell you, that they have altered their intention justly and necessarily upon warrantable grounds; as that the nature of their promise of Allegiance to him and his posteritie was not absolute, but Conditionate; that in the third Article of the National Covenant, the Conditions implicitly understood in the Oath of Allegiance are explicitly mentioned: that his (viz. the King's) Cross walking to these Conditions (although they intended to maintain their Allegiance) hath forced them from it, against their will, that it is no power, nor fear that hath made them to alter their purpose; but a necessarie dutie for publick safetie to discharge their trust; this they will saie; and they will denie that which you saie, that the Oath was meant absolutely and without all respect to Conditions; as if Allegiance should have been due unto him without anie respect to his Legal standing and Capacitie; and
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if Allegiance was onlie due to him in this respect; then it was first due to the Law it self; and to the Law-making power before it was due to him; and to him onlie as subordinate thereunto: If therefore his Mis carriage be such as to intend the overthrow of that; by which he only could stand; then he overthrow's himself, and no bodie can help him to stand without a foundation or is obliged to it. This they will plead to justifie their proceeding to an alteration. And then to that which you saie further; viz. that Obedience is commanded in an absolute sense, and not upon Condition of their good carriage: that it is commanded as that which Servants ow to froward Masters; Rom. 13. & 1 Pet. 2. 18. (I say) to this they will confesse, that such a subjection is indeed Comanded to everie private person, and due to the powers that are in plenarie possession of the government; from their Subjects; but they will denie that the Parliament or those that are employed by their autoritie are to bee look't upon as private persons, or as Subjects in their actions: they will tell you: that all the power of the King is virtually in the Parliament; and eminently above him in a higher sphere of trustees and representatives of the Nation; Whose sitting to act in a capacitie above him doth not onlie subordinate him in his waie of acting for the time of their Sitting: but doth in some sort suspend his whole influence upon the Subject as to government: which King *James* well understood, and therefore called the Parliament a Societie of 400 Kings, and himself for the time as no bodie: for hee is but as a Servant to see the laws which are made executed; but that the trustees and representatives of the Nation have the law-making power in them by the law of nature and the positive Law of the Land. And lastly when you saie that there will be no place left for suffering; if obedience bee only conditional, they will tell you that Parliaments are not called by God and nature, nor in the intention of the Nation to suffer, but to rectifie the Causes of unjust sufferings; and to reduce the exorbitance of Kings into a right order. Now when they, who are in places of power, saie

say all this, who is it amongst the private Subjects that can justly contest with them? or controule them? except hee have an immediate Commission to them from the most High; and if none without such a Commission is obliged to judge them, their failings are no matter of scruple to anie privat man's Conscience, they may bee a matter of grief and praier for them, for why must I bee scrupled at doing that which is my dutie at present, becaus I suspect another hath not don his dutie, of whom yet I am not set to bee a Judge.

The third scruple is this; that all Subjects are to be allowed a Competencie of judgment concerning their own actions, though not of State-matters: becaus unto God they are accountable for whatsoever they shall do: and if they do anie thing doubtfully, they sin. Now the owning of the present power as of God, is doubtfull to them; if therefore having the forementioned grounds of scruple they do own it, they will sin; it is therefore necessarie for them either to have the grounds of their scruple cleered or not to own them, if the doubt cannot bee cleered.

To all this I shall saie; that it is a truth that men must bee allowed to bee Judges of their own actions, and that if they do anie thing without Faith, it is sin in them, if therefore they are in doubt of that which is offered to bee don, I think they are bound to suspend the doing thereof, till they bee cleer, that they can do it without sin. But then also I conceive they are bound to use means to have their Scruple cleered one waie or other; and that in the use of those means they ought not to intangle their Conscience into a judicature of matters which are beyond the sphere of their own actings; but should only strictly inquire what their own dutie is in their special Callings; and if the Brethren would have don this; or could have been perswaded to have entred upon anie rational course tending to accomplish this. I am confident much of the danger, if not all, whereinto they have cast themselves and the publick, might have been prevented, and they cleered in the scruples which they entertain and put into

the heads of other men. I speak this concerning som, whose actions I know have had a great influence upon others; whose scruples have run out upon the interpretation of State-matters, whereof they were not at all made Judges, either in publick to censure those that do manage the same; or otherwise to possess their fellow-Subjects by sinister informations with jealousies against them; if these had not made themselves ~~adversaries~~ in this matter, but would have contained their thoughts within their own limits, and the bounds of the Rule; they would have prevented the snare's, whereinto by such considerations they have brought their own Consciences, and the Consciences of others that respect them; for mine own part, I did endeavor (foreseeing that the custom already taken up to meddle in these matters, would upon this occasion bee more then ever followed) to prevent the further practice; or to take off by conscionable rules som that were too much inclined that waie, by a Treatise upon that Subject, first in brief, and then more at large; but this was look't upon as a time-serving practice; and a cloak to sinful compliances for private ends: and afterward, when the House of Parliament began to consider of an engagement, as a ground to settle matters and the mindes of men, to entertein a mutual relation of friendship one with another, in a Common-wealth-waie; before the Engagement was published while's men were full of fears, and apprehensions about it, what it might tend unto; I did negotiate with som of our chief leading men, for a private conference, to bring on, with their concurrence, a Treatie, between godlie and dissenting Brethren, lest upon new emergencies (as is fallen out) wee might bee irrecoverably distracted, and divided within our own thoughts, and towards one another; or rather from each other by jealousies to incline them hereunto, I did represent, that nothing would bee our preservation, but our right understanding of one another in that wherein wee do agree, to hold forth our union therein to all the world; and our determination of som regular court to prevent offences, and

and breaches for the things wherein there might bee some disagreement, and diversitie of opinions, which upon new emergencies might arise, or bee cast in perhaps to divide us; here then I proposed this Method, seeing it was apparent enough, that Satan's aim in all these confusions, was, to overthrow the profession of Christianitie, and put down the Ministerie thereof by gaining, and taking an opportunitie in this change of Government, and time of licentiousness, to vent all manner of damnable Heresies against the fundamental Truths, which are after godliness in Christ Jesus; First by dividing the mindes of the witnesses of this Truth about outward concernments, one from another, so that they should not bee able, or willing to concur, or agree, about that which is their great and main concernment, viz. *The testimonie of Jesus*. Secondly, by making them, through the neglect of their main concernment, (viz. the testimonie of the life and death, and Resurrection of *Jesus*, and of the Covenant of Peace, between God and us in him) to become contemptible to the world; and through their meddling with heterogeneous concernments of the world, to become an eie-sore, and an object of jealousie to the secular Powers. Thirdly, by engaging them into parties about State-affairs, to make them the ring-leaders of designs, or at least, to be counted such (which is almost all one, as to his end) that the guilt of publick evils, and miscarriages, may bee imputed unto them more then to others. Seeing (I saie) these were Satan's aims; I proposed this Method for us, to proceed in some conference, tending to prevent the evils; and to settle us in an agreement about future proceedings.

First, that wee should consider and resolv, how to proceed unanimously, as one man, by undoubted scriptural Rules, in opposing fundamental Heresies, and upholding the fundamental truths of Christianitie, and the practice of godliness.

Secondly, that wee should consider and resolv, how to own unanimously, and upon what undeniable grounds, to profess our beeing in the Ministerie; what to own

therein, as *jure Divino*; and what to acknowledg to bee but prudential.

Thirdly, that wee should consider and resolv, how to maintain the Engagement which wee lie under, by reason of the National Oath, and Covenant; what therein, as to us, in thesetimes is altered; and what for ever is unalterably to bee prosecuted.

Fourthly, and lastly, that wee should consider, and predetermine, in case a new Engagement bee offered (for when I made these proposals to som, the Engagement was not yet voted) by what Rules wee ought to walk; to bee able to finde out the inoffensive waie of doing our dutie towards all, aswel Superiors as equals.

These proposals were made to more then one or two, as preparatives to bring on an agreement, between the dissenting godlie parties about Church-Government, and Discipline: that the dore which their division hath opened, to let in all manner of disorderlines, in the profession of Religion, might bee stop't at last, and Satan lose the advantages which hee hath gotten thereby against us: but they were not hearkned unto: either, becaus I was look't upon as a stranger; or as a subtil man that served State-ends, for som advantage to my self, and made this proposal a cloak onely to som further design; or becaus men's spirits were straightned, and prepossessed with particular apprehensions, and could not bee raised to an impartial contemplation of that which was truly publick, and then seasonable to bee don. But if these matters had then been thought upon, or could yet bee determined, so, as to cleer our judgments to one another; and to all the world, in that which concern's our dutie in our sphere of acting; without reflecting upon others', in that whereof wee are not made their judges; there would not bee so much animositie, and so manie mistakes, and destructive jealousies, as now are amongst us; nor could wee bee so much in the dark, and under so manie scruples, and snares of conscience as now wee do lie, for want of following this method of proceeding in determining the matters, whereof

wee are made competent judges; for if wee had judged these matters by the Rules and Principles, wherein wee are fully agreed; or did yet exercise our selves by the right use of these Rules and Principles, to judg our own actions in these matters, rather then other men's failings from their duties, wherein to us they are not accountable, wee would finde light to walk in these occasions without doubting; and see caus, to cast off the scruples which are raised upon the grounds before mentioned; as beeing matters whereof wee are not competent judges, and without the consideration of which, our actions relating to the publick, may, and ought to bee regulated: and can bee regulated by the rational and conscionable disquirie of the forenamed proposals; which I have offered now unto you, as formerly to others, that you may see, that I am so far from restraining my brethren to bee competent judges of their own actions; that it hath been one of my designs, to bring them to a regular waie of judging thereof; that they might not walk doubtfully therein, as now they do.

Those things beeing thus at large premised to what I am about to saie, for the resolving of your third scruple; I shall intreat you to consider, whether the former scruple, concerning the alteration of the government against the oath of Allegiance, taken by those that did alter it; is not raised in us, by a judicature of State-matters, whereof you confess us not to bee competent judges: and if no competent judges, then (I saie) no judges at all; to define matters with reference to our conscience, to saie, whether they have don well or ill; but I must saie they stand or fall, to their own master in this business of the alteration of Government; I may, as a rational man, and a Subject concerned in point of Common-welfare, look upon their actions in altering the government, with the eye and judgment of discretion, to discern what they saie, and what they do for the alteration: but when I am gon to the utmost extent of my discerning facultie, yet I must make none other definition, but such as keep's my conscience free from beeing obliged, to give a sentence which will

scruple mee in the points of dutie towards them. If they
 saie that the judicature of all the King's actions doth be-
 long unto them, as they are the Representatives and Tru-
 stees of a free Nation, which hee was to govern by Laws,
 which they shall chuse, and not by will; and that hee for
 raising war against them, and refusing to give an account
 of his actions, (to those whom they appointed as judges in
 their name, to call him to an account of treasonable en-
 terprises) hath been deprived of the government where-
 with hee was intrusted, and of his life, and that, as in
 Cases of Treason, by the Law of nature, and of Nations,
 the prerogative which hee lost for himself, was also for-
 feited for his posteritie; and that their proceedings against
 him, and those that would support him in his pretended in-
 terest of absoluteness, above Parliaments, or of independ-
 encie from them; are such as they will answer to God
 for; and as they will undertake to shew their grounds of,
 before all the world, and if according to these sayings,
 they do make Laws, to settle us in another relation one
 to another, and under themselves (that is under the con-
 stant government of Representatives) without a King,
 and House of Lords; If (I saie) I can clearly discern, that
 they saie, and do all this, without turbalencie of spirit,
 in a waile of counsel; rationally and orderly behaving
 themselves; looking aswel to God, as to men, and pro-
 fessing according to their light, a willingness to keep a
 good conscience towards both; at all times, if (again I
 saie) when I use the judgment of discretion, I finde things
 thus constituted with them, what shall I saie other, but
 that this thing is of God; that his will must bee don in
 earth as in heaven; that power belongeth unto him, and
 that hee exalteth over the Kingdoms of men, whomsoe-
 ver hee pleaseth: If I finde them by these Principles, and
 acting in their places of trust over mee, to intend order-
 lie courses; and minde the things belonging to common-
 safetie; I cannot see what warrant I have to disown them
 to bee of God. Sure I am, except God had disowned
 the King's exercise of power, and blasted his Counsels,
 and

and given him up to these men, to be judged by them, as hee was, they could have don nothing unto him; if then God hath disowned him, and shew'd these in the sight of all the world, and doth intrust them with the management of all publick affairs; who am I, to take upon mee to disown them in the places wherewith they are actually possessed, except I had a commission from him, to let them see, that either their Principles of acting are not allowed by him, or that their actions are not according to their Principles; but if I am not enabled to do either of these two; but rather am convinced that the Principles, which they have taken up, are of God in them; and that their actions by these Principles, with Counsel and courage, by a professed confidence in him, have been carried on in an orderly course to this issue by his Providence; then I must own them thus far to be of God; and look upon them as instruments in his hand; to bring about this alteration of affairs, to fulfil his judgments one waie; his mercies another waie, and both waies, his determined Counsel; which hath concluded mee under their power, and doth subordinate mee in my calling under their actions, to do my dutie without grudging, or murmuring, without disputing and scrupulositie, being harmless and blameless in my waie, as it becometh a child of God, holding forth the word of life and light, as the rule of my walking.

Thus then I conclude upon these grounds; that if I do own them in their places by anie dutifull actions in my calling, I do not sin; but rather fulfil that which I am bound to think (according to the judgment of discretion concerning them; and the definitive judgment of dutie in Christianitie concerning my self) is the will of God, and the work of my present calling; for if I by doing my dutie, and having none other aim, but to act within my sphere; do eventually set them up, and own them in their places; I must attribute that unto God's ordering of matters; and leav the effect thereof unto him; but if I should think, that becaus I suppose such an event will follow,
that

that therefore I must not intend my present dutie; I saie if I should think thus; then I walk not in simplicitie, but according to the wisdom of this world; and I pretermine in my thoughts, the events which are onely in God's hands; and I follow not a cleer and universal rule in my actings; but the rule of a design, which I have framed to my self, upon a conjectural apprehension of som event, which I would not have com to pass; for in effect, it is as much as if I had said thus; I do not see that these men are of God; and becaus I see it not; I will do
 33 nothing, no not the best duties of my present calling;
 33 lest by doing that which is my dutie, I seem to own them,
 33 and lest it may tend to confirm them in their places: which in my apprehension would bee to drive a design against the present powers, by a sinful neglect of doing my dutie to the publick: which how it can bee warrantable in Christianitie, I know not.

The last part of the third scruple, is an aggravation of the doubt; When you saie: *besides by subscribing, they do not onely own the power, but also the imposing of the engagement; (if not directly, yet indirectly) which they cannot see how it agrees with the Rule, that require's higher powers should bee a terror to evil, not to the good, as by this means they are.*

If in the first part of the scruple, when you said, that though private men bee no competent judges of State-affairs, yet they are competent judges of their own actions; you meant by their own actions, their owning or disowning the present power, viz. that they were to judge competently, whether the present power was to bee owned or disowned by themselves, yea, or no; I shall in some sense grant this; as thus. First, that they were definitively to determine with themselves, what everie private man is bound to do, as a Christian towards the present powers, to own them or disown them, according to the Rule of obedience, prescribed by God in the word. Secondly, that they were also definitively to determine with themselves, what the present powers are, that are actually over them, who are obediencially to bee owned or disowned. In these two cases it is cleer, that everie man
 must

must bee allowed to judg, who is actually over him in power, and by what Rule of obedience hee ought to walk under him, as owning him in his place; but if the sens bee this, that everie man is competently to judg his own actions, in respect of the consequence which they may have, towards the owning, or the disowning of the present powers; and accordingly as hee shall see caus, to own them or disown them, that hee may act or not act, as hee shall think his action conducing to one or the other end; so that the aim of owning or of disowning shall become the measure of the rectitude of his actions: if (I saie) this bee the meaning of those words, then I must denie anie man to bee a competent judg of his own actions: for no man is to judg of the rectitude, or unrighteousness of his actions by the eventualitie thereof, which hee may propose unto himself will follow: for in this sens I take the Prophet's words: *O Lord! I know that the waie of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.* This is true, as to the event; no man can direct anie thing which hee doth to anie event; and therefore hee is to measure nothing by the eventualitie thereof, in his own apprehension, but hee is bound to measure it by a Rule and Precept, and in this sens the contrarie is true, viz. It is in man that walketh to direct his steps, els this promise would bee in vain: *Hee that ordereth his conversation aright, shall see the salvation of God,* Psal. 50. 23. and the Commandement; *See that yee walk circumspectly, & as wise not as fools, but as wise,* Ephes. 5. 15. it is therefore in a man as his dutie, to direct his steps by a rule, but it is not in himself at all to direct his steps to anie event whatsoever; for it is said, that *man's goings are of the Lord; how can a man then understand his own waies,* Prov. 20. 24. God's providence doth order all men's goings to his secret ends, and by his own counsel to determined effects; therefore it is not possible for a man to understand the eventual tendencie of his own waies; and if it is not possible for him to understand this, then it is not lawful for him to measure, or judg the nature of his action by this; now if I do not mistake the matter and meaning of this scruple, it seem's first to assert

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that

Jer. 10. 23.

that for them, to own the present powers to bee of God, is a sin; upon this account; becaus it is doubtful to them upon the grounds before mentioned: (which were pure State-considerations) and *what is not of faith is sin; ergo* they may do nothing, which in their judgment tends to own them as of God: for although they are no competent judges of State-matters, yet they are competent judges of their own actions; and if they judg their own actions to bee an owning of them, as of God: then to them, to do these actions is a sin; and consequently, they must abstain from them, although in themselves the actions bee never so good; onely becaus they judg them to have a tendencie eventually to speak, and own such a thing, whereof they doubt, and which they would not have them to speak; therefore they think themselves bound in conscience to abstain from them, which I think is a great mistake, as already hath been shewed; and upon this mistake, *the second part of the scruple* assert's, that in the act of subscribing, there is more sin then in other obediencial Acts: upon this account, becaus it doth tend, not onely to own the present power; but also the imposing of the Engagement, at least indirectly. Now saie you, they may do nothing, either directly, or indirectly, which may own the imposing of the Engagement; and why? becaus, saie you, they cannot see how the Engagement agree's with the rule that require's higher powers should bee a terror to the evil, not to the good; as by this means they are. If you had said, becaus they cannot see anie thing required in the Engagement, to bee agreeable to the rule of a Christian's walking, or the dutie of Subjects to the higher powers, the reason would have been to my judgment satisfactorie; and wee must have examined the nature of the things required in the Engagement; to know whether they were inconsistent with the rules of Christianitie, and the Dutie of Subjects; and upon the discoverie of what is meant by beeing true and faithful to the Common-wealth, as it is now established, without a King and Houf of Lords wee might have com to some conclusion; for if there
had

had been found in these words a sense consistent with these rules, and this Dutie; then the scruple could have been resolved; and the Conscience settled; but now this cannot be done; because the Scruple is not fixed upon the material part of the Engagement; which is our private concernment, to see what we thereby are obliged to do; and so accordingly to resolve to be engaged or not to be engaged therewith: but it is fixed upon a Construction which is made of the intention of the higher powers in proposing the engagement, and upon the disagreement of that which they do, by the proposal of the engagement, with that which the rule of their calling doth require of them. Now to mee a scruple so fixed is wholly to be rejected: because I finde it not lawful for mee to make my self a Judge either of their intentions; or of their particular actions, how agreeable they are with the rules of their calling, I may tell them as well as other men what their intentions ought to be; and how they should take heed to the rule of their Calling; this I may, and ought to do in these; but in *Hypocrit* to judge positively what their intentions are (except I were one of their Counsel) and what their actions are in order to a rule (except I were made acquainted with all the Circumstances of their state) is a thing which I dare not undertake; far less then may I upon the supposal of such a judgement concerning their intentions or actions, be obliged to suspend mine own resolution from doing the duties of my calling, or scruple my Conscience about acting things lawfull in my place. I dare not say then, that by the means of the engagement, they either intend to be, or are a terror to the good, and not to the evil, contrary to the rule given by God to higher powers. But I look upon the imposing of it with the judgement of discretion, to be a thing, which they think absolutely necessarie for common safeties; and therefore press with a severe penaltie: which I must leave them to answer for, if there be no such necessitie; but in the definitive judgement of Christianitie, as the engagement relat's to mee, I find a Dutie in it; whereunto I

am required to oblige my self; which in Conscience I cannot refuse to do; and so Subscribe it with a full purpose to perform the Dutie which the law of Christianitie and of a good Subject doth require. What Consequences may follow upon, and what interpretations others may make of this my action, I am not solicitous of, I look to nothing further then to the warrantableness of that which I do at present. For as in reason, *Ex vero nil nisi verum*; So in moralitie and Christianitie *Ex bono nil nisi bonum sequitur per se*.

As for matters of offence (the subject of your fourth Scruple) which may follow *per accidens* upon lawful actions, in som Cases they are unavoidable; for if I think I am in Conscience bound to do something as a Dutie, and another bee so weak as to bee offended at mee for doing it, how can this offence bee avoided? must I neglect a dutie, and wound mine own conscience, becaus another is offended at that which I do? If hee bee so unreasonable as not to let mee have the libertie to keep a good Conscience; in following the dictates thereof for my self; must I bee so foolish as to give up the use of my libertie to his weakness? In matters of indifferencie where I may chuse to do, or not to do; and where nothing else com's in competition, but the meer pleasing of my self; with the danger of displeasing another; there I am bound not to please my self, but another to his edification: nay although it may bee to my great bodilie disadvantage, I must bear it, rather then my brother should have anie spiritual disadvantage by mee; for there is no proportion between a bodilie and spiritual inconveniencie; but in Case the inconveniencie which I do incur, is not at all bodilie, but spiritual; no law of Charitie can oblige mee to undergo it; for no man can bee pleased or edified by my spiritual disadvantage, this is to shew why none ought to bee offended at mee for doing that which I think is my Dutie. And why if anie bee offended, I nevertheless must own that which I have don and let them know, that the offence is not given, but unjustly taken. But your 4th Scruple run's upon another

nother strain of offences, and tend's to another scope, which is to plead for the Non-subscribers under the Notion of weak Brethren, whom wee are bid not to offend. Their weakness is to think that unlawful (which perhaps is lawful) becaus it may seem contrarie to a rule of the word. As in this Case of the engagement ; the rule of Oaths and promises seem's to bee violated ; which a man is bound to keep though to his hurt.

For mine own part, I do heartily wish and praie to God that the spirit of Christian compassion may bee amongst us ; and that the Non-subscribers may not onely bee look't upon by the imposers and subscribers, as weak brethren and those that ought to bee dealt tenderly withall ; but that also they may behave themselves so that all may have Cause, and chiefly the imposers of the engagement, to think that it is rather through weaknes and tendernes of Conscience indeed, then through som other inclination that they refuse to subscribe. For I must tell you ingenuously that it is as hard a task as ever I have medled withall, to make som of the imposers of the engagement belev, that it is more out of tendernes of Conscience, then out of a design that most men contradict the Subscription of the engagement : I truly belev it, to bee that scruple which you allege in most of the Ministers, if not in all that are Godlie ; but the violence and cross actings of som doth bring an invincible prejudice against all.

As for these that are in places of power to provide for common safetie, they saie to this : that it is a matter of absolute necessitie to press the settlement of som fundamental relation in the Common-wealth between the members thereof ; and therefore they cannot in Conscience neglect their trust, but must indispensably endeavor the preservation of the publick by this means ; and if their Conscience bee as strongly engaged one waie, as the other's are another way, no Court is in view, but a friendlie treatie to prevent the inconveniencie of mutual offences, and further breaches ; that mistakes may bee removed and differences reconciled : which I shall not cease to praie for to God and Solicite towards men.


The last Scruple, or rather aspersiō of yours in answer to what I had said in my last, I shall not contradict; for I willingly confess, that in doubtful matters and difficult cases the spirits of Prophets should bee subject unto the Prophets: only admit of the limitation which I did add in my former expressiō; that no Church, far less a forreign Church, ought to bee made a Judge of Civil Sanctions in a state. But that the spirits of Prophets ought to bee Subject to the Prophets, is one of the great fundamentals which I mainly press as a means to rectifie our endles disputes: nor is anle man more averse from enthusiasticall fancies then I am; yet I am not led by any implicite faith or resignation of my judgement to other men's opinions: but I seek light from them; and when I find that upon Conference I can neither bring them to my sens, nor they mee by Conviction of my Judgement to their's, I think it my Dutie to be silent, and to suspect mine own opinion as that which may bee wrong, although I cannot see it to bee so.

You may perceiv by the largeness of my discours upon the heads of these Scruples that my spirit is not straitned in Love towards the Brethren that desire som help; which as I said at first, God only can give, who is the Father of lights and of all good gifts; and if wee laie one another's Cases to heart with tendernes and meeknes, and cal upon him one for another, wee may hope that hee will bleis our gifts for mutual advantage. The secrecie and cautiousnes which is requisit in this business you may assure your self of, with all Confidence; as also of all other duties and offices of love, which in the fear of God may bee expected from

S James
April 4 1650.

Your affectionate Brother in Christ
JOHN DURRE.

Postscript



Postscript.

Y^{our}s came to my hand on the 18. March, the next daie I began to answer it, but I was obliged to go out of the town the same daie, towards night, which interrupted my proceeding for a few daies, and occasioned a delay, which I would not have you to impute to anie unwillingness to serv you; but the chief intent of this *Postscript*, is now not to excuse this slow return; but to make som addition to that, which may bee your satisfaction concerning the first scruple. For since I wrote that which here is said, concerning the Question you make; what I mean by that known dutie which I often urge; I have light upon a place in the reproposals, to which you (I make no doubt) allude. It is in pag. 10. 11. and there my meaning is, to call that a cleer and known dutie, which in the second Section of the Humble Proposals is confessed, to bee from the light of nature, from the judgment of the Learned, from the practice of Christians in former ages, from their own Principles, and from their former engagements consonant to the will of God; viz. that they should live quietly and peaceably in their places and callings, submitting to such things as are imposed upon, or required of them, by the powers which are in actual possession, beeing in themselves lawfull and necessarie, to the preservation of our selves and others: which may bee don (saie they) without disputing the right and title of those that are in place. To do this, (which the humble proposals themselves thus acknowledg upon so manie grounds, to bee a dutie of Subjects towards Superiors, who have none other cleer title, but actual possession) I do there call the cleer and known dutie, which the Engagement doth require, which therefore ought not to bee scrupled at, by those who are willing to perform this dutie. For if it bee freely acknowledged upon so manie cleer grounds, that the powers who are in actual

actual possession without inquiring into their title, should be obeyed in things just, and necessarie for common preservation; then there is no cause for anie man to scruple at the Engagement; for the Engagement by the cleer sense of the words, and the whole tenor of the Act, by which it is imposed, doth require nothing more then in this acknowledgment is exprest to be a Dutie, which I in my Reproposals call *cleer*, because the proposals allege so manie grounds to evidence it; and I call it *known*, because they themselves so fully confess it. Besides the former delaye, there hath been another step in the slow transcription of these former sheets: that I might have a copie of them by mee; for my man that copied them out, hath not the hand of a readie writer; yet I hope no time is lost, and I assure you, if anie be, it is not willingly.

St James's this 9th
April 1650.

Your brother and servant
in the Gospel,

JOHN DURIE

The third Letter.

Reverend and worthie Sir!

I Must still return you manie thanks, and acknowledge my self much obliged to you, that you are readie to bestow such unwearied pains, in performing an office of love to your weak brethren: you needed not to have spoken anie thing touching the long stay of your Letter; for I had reason to wonder rather it came so soon, considering you had taken such pains in it; mine had been returned sooner to you, but that I desired some friends might first have a sight of yours, that I might know their thoughts about it: for my self I may truly saie, that I have cause to bless God for your labors, and from that light which I have received from them; some of my good friends are now satisfied in the business; others,

who are truly godlie still stick fast in their former doubts, and cannot see their waie cleer before them. I finde it to bee true which you mentioned, namely, that it is not in the power of man, but a priviledge belonging to God alone, to bee able to satisfie the scruples of a tender conscience: It is bee that sit's (as it were) at the stern of everie man's understanding, and can steer it which waie bee pleaseth; so as that argument which seem's to bee verie weightie to one man, to another seem's to have little strength in it: that distinction which seem's to one verie fit for clearing of knottie scruples, doth seem to another to have little soliditie in it: so that if wee will not violate the rule of love, wee must have the patience to permit others to bee of a differing judgment from us in doubtful things, and yet like them never the worse, when their liking stand's as strongly to the best things as our own. Give mee leav therefore to commend it to you, as a principal office of Christian charitie, to do what lie's in you to take off the thoughts of such as are in place (whom you have anie interest in) from that uncharitable apprehension, that such who refuse the ingagement, do it not out of weakness, but wilfulness: for such a pervers principle as this put on the Prelates in times past, to the violent persecuting of pious Non-conformists becaus (they having said much in defence of superstitious ceremonies) they took it as granted, that such as still stumbled at them must needs do it out of obstinacie, and perversness, and not out of true tenderness; and when anie shall have thoroughly digested this dangerous principle, they may easily bee carried forward to the exercise of much violence, against the dear servants of God, whom they ought to cherish as their own children. Give mee leav briefly to tell you what it is, that som godlie men stick at.

First, It being taken as granted, that King and Lords, and all the Priviledges of Parliament must bee subordinate to the publick safetie, yet who must bee judges? what make's most for the publick safetie, but the major part of our representatives, who were chosen for that purpose, who when the House was full and free, (as before I told you) declared it to bee most for the publick safetie, to agree with the King upon the best terms they could, and that there should bee still a continuance both of him, and the House of Lords.

G

Secondly,

Secondly, It is objected, that none are thought now competent judges of those actions, which have been done by such who are in power, but themselves, who are the authors of them, which crosses the usual rule, (vid. that no man is a competent judge of his own actions) and also their former practice; for heretofore, both King and Parliament, in many of their Declarations, did appeal to the judgment of the people, to determine whether of their proceedings did most agree to the preservation of Religion, and the libertie of the Subject, and accordingly to side with them, or against them; and now the whole Kingdom, Nobilitie, Gentry, Divines, Lawyers, and men of all ranks and orders, must bee bound up to yield a blind obedience to a few men, that have gotten the Government into their hands, without their consent, and do exercise it in a far more arbitrarie waie, then ever the King himself did.

Thirdly, It makes them much doubt, whether those in power will bee real for Religion or not, because they suffer such abominable blasphemies to break forth in divers parts of the Kingdom, and no condign punishment is exercised against the authors of them, there being a generation of men risen up in many places, who openly profess themselves to be deified; and therefore that the most hideous cursing and swearing, beastlie drunkenness, or foul uncleanness are things not evil in them, because they are the will of God: of whom they might bee easily informed, and take notice (if they pleased) as they are of such who refuse the Engagement.

Fourthly, They still stick at Romans 13. as not to bee understood of usurped powers, on these grounds; First, if bigger powers bee of God onely, by a common providence, though without a rule, this will make ill for the authority and credit of Magistracie; for then Magistrates should bee no more of God, then plagues, famines, and other common calamities, all which come in a providential waie.

Secondly, the powers here spoken of, are such as must not be resisted, but usurpers may bee resisted as Athaliah was; they must bee maintained by paying of tribute; usurpers not so.

Thirdly, these are said to bee ordained of God; but lawful power onely is God's Ordinance, not usurped power. Lawful Magistrates are, not onely ordained by a secret providence, (as magis

godlie men are ordained to condemnation) but by his written word and sanction. The sons of Aaron had another manner of Ordination, then Korah and his companie, though they took upon them to exercise the Priestlie office.

Fourthly, The Magistrate here spoken of, is the Minister of God, Ergo called of God to that service, as Ministers are to their work; hee is the Minister of God for the welfare of the people, aspersa not so; hee is to take vengeance on evil doers, and execute wrath for God, Ergo, not by providence onely (as thieves, robbers, and foreign invaders) but by place and calling.

Fifthly, by this reason, if Malignants, Levellers, Papists, or any others should get to bee the strongest partie, wee must yield obedience to them, as to the powers that are of God.

Sir, I dare not desire you to clear these scruples, lest I should put you to more pains: but if your leisure will permit to do it, I shall bee thankfull, and leave you to take what leisure you please. I am sorry to hear that any good men should refuse so faire, and rational a waie of accommodation, as you tender to them; yet I dare not censure them, because I am ignorant of their grounds: but (I suppose) if you had made the like motion to Mr N. N. Mr N. N. or some other of their temper, it would have been lovingly entertained. Sir, I hope you shall not repent of your pains, if still you exercise more patience in seeking, how such a business may be brought about: and I know you have often made use of that promise, wherein blessedness is pronounced to Peace-makers. Thus desiring our good God still to enlarge you with affections, and abilities fit for making up these great breaches, that are still amongst us; I resign you to his mercie.

Yours most obliged in the

this 29th. of April

best bond of love.

1650.



The Answer to the third Letter.

Reverend and loving Brother in Christ!

BY your last of the 29th of April, you have given me
 cause to bless God, that hee hath been pleased to give
 a blessing to these single-hearted thoughts, which I have
 imparted to you, concerning the matter of your former
 scruples. When wee are in anie trouble, wee are like *Hagar*
 in the wilderness, for shee having given her self for
 lost, when her bottle of water was spent, could not see a well
 of water before her, till God opened her eyes to perceive it: so it
 is with us, when our little provisions of comfort, which
 wee have bottled up to our selves from som particular
 props, are spent; wee are at a loss what to do; till
 God in the *Wilderness* (whereinto hee bring's us of pur-
 pose, that wee should look up to him alone) open our
 eyes, that wee may finde in himself a whole well full of
 water, in stead of a bottle full; for I shall ingenuously
 confess, that in these changes, at first I was at a great
 stand, aswel as your self and others, nor was I able for a
 good while to finde my waie, till God opened mine eyes
 to behold som Principles, which became wells of intelle-
 ctual Refreshment unto mee; which although, I was not
 altogether ignorant of; yet till my thoughts were led to
 reflect upon them, by a right application thereof, to these oc-
 casions I could not at all make use of them for anie refresh-
 ment: therefore, I found that it is God's peculiar work, to
 make the wilderness of our spiritual state, a pool of water, and
 the drie land springs of water; to him therefore wee must look
 up, who hath promised, to pour water upon the thirstie, and
 floods upon the drie ground; to him wee must call, who hath
 promised to give his holie Spirit, to such as ask it of him,
 to him is due the whole glorie of our enlargements from
 all straits; and wee ought to assist one another towards
 him,

Gen. 22. 15. 19.

Isa. 41. 18.

Isa. 44. 3.

him, by praier, aswel as by Counsel and Conferences; for without a spirit subordinate unto his will, teaching us love to each other; and fear to offend him, wee shall but confound, and entangle each other in our disquies of doubtful matters; and although wee should offer to one another, most undeniable and demonstrable truths; yet our holding forth of them will bee ineffectual to each other, except God both direct our eies to behold them, and teach us to profit by them, in making a right application thereof, to our special concernments. When the Disciples going to *Emaus* were sad, and had Christ in their companie, yet they knew him not till their eies were opened; which make's mee the more sensible of the dutie of mutual forbearance, in Cases of different opinions between godlie brethren; and the more affectionately willing to impart that, which I through mercie have received; as knowing it to bee nothing of mine own; but onely that which God hath given, to the end that I should bee exercised in the work of love, thereby to serv others; and that hee may take his own opportunitie, to dispense light and comfort thereby, according to his own good will and pleasure. I shall therefore acknowledg my self upon this account, a debtor unto all that fear God, of that which I am able to suggest unto them; and I had before this time answered these two last scruples (which are not your own, but other's as you tell mee) if you had not intimated, that I should take my best leitiure, and convenience to do it; beeing then unexpectedly released from a preaching task, which I thought I should have undergone; I thought good to applie my self to this meditation, at this time in stead thereof, by which, if it pleas the Lord to enable mee, to bear the burden of your friend's spirit, so as to become instrumental to their eas; I shall have cause to rejoyce in his goodness, and praise his name for it.

The first Scruple then is concerning the Judicature of that which mak'es most for publick safety, your friends who stumble at the engagement saie, that the major part of the Representatives did declare, when the house was free

and full, that it was most for publick safetie to agree with the King upon the best terms they could, and that there should bee still a continuance both of him and of the House of Lords.

Suppose this to bee so, what then? then (say they) it follow's that the present constitution of affairs (being contrarie to that which the major part of the house then declared) is not for publick safetie; and if this constitution doth not tend to publick safetie, then it follow's that the engagement by which it is confirmed ought not to be entered into; for no man should oblige himself to that which is contrarie to publick safetie. This I conceiv is the whole strength of the Scruple as it may lie in their conception.

But I shall freely tell you that with mee it hath no weight at all, as to engage my Conscience in the business; as to take mee off from taking the Engagement, for many things are here presupposed which are to mee uncertain, and though they bee granted to bee true, yet they reach not at all to put an obligation upon my Conscience to abstain from the engagement as now it is offered.

They presuppose here that in a state of War as well as in a peaceable constitution of affairs whatsoever is determined and allowed by a major part is most for publick safetie which is to mee a very doubtful assertion. Wee finde that matters have been carried on all along in both Kingdoms rather by a Minor then by a Major part of the Nation; and if this rule should be taken up universally; *Whatsoever the Major part doth is best don; and most agreeable to Justice in all things*; it will go ill with the people of God in the world; and the narrow wale, with the few that walk in it, will not bee justified: this rule therefore is not in all Cases and at all times to bee admitted, but it must needs admit of some restriction, whereby in matters of extraordinarie concernment, a partie which is most considerable, though fewer, may dissent from a partie which is less considerable, though more in number. Wee see then that this first presupposall whereupon the whole Scruple is grounded is not sound.

Besides

Besides this presupposal, there is this also intimated in the Scruple, that what formerly was declared to bee most for publick safetie, must now also be judged to bee so; as if the severall Emergencies in state affairs could not give cause to alter justly their opinions concerning the waite of publick safetie.

Again a third presupposal is implied in this Scruple viz. That the House is not now free and full as then it was; which how I can take upon mee to assert I know not, seeing they who are onelie competent Judges of their own freedom, do vote themselves to bee free; and seeing it is an undoubted fundamental law of the Parliamentarie Constitution that ffortie Members regularly met are a full House to all intents and purposes, aswel as four-hundred: now it is known that the House was never less then ffortie: therefore it hath alwaies been full: and a full House may repeal it's own acts upon Emergencies as it seeth cause.

Fourthly, it is not only presupposed, but expressly asserted, that the House declared that it was most for publick safetie to agree with the King on the best terms they could, and that there should bee stil a continuance of Him and of the House of Lords; Truly I beleeve that times were, when Votes did passe in the House to this effect, though not in those terms; which is cleere by severall publick Declarations importing no less; but I beleeve also that upon new Emergencies their sense of agreeing did alter, and that since the King was at *Holdenbie*, and the Armie took him into their custodie, and that hee still refused to yield to their Propositions, their sense of publick safetie did much varie, from what you here express it was, as was manifest by the votes of *Non-addresses*; and it is certain, that this which is alleged was not the vote *in terminis*; for which the Members were separated from the House: that Vote was *in terminis*, this; *That the Answers of the King to the Propositions of both Houses, were a ground for the House to proceed upon, for the settlement of the Peace of the Kingdom.* This was the fatal dividing Vote, which in the sense of some, I believe, did tend to that, which you saie the House declared;

declared; but in the sens of others, it might tend to settle the peace of the Kingdom without him. Som thought it was best to agree with the King upon anie terms whatsoever, to carrie on a design: but others thought it more safe, not to admit of the terms which hee offered, for fear of that design.

It appear's by that which is fallen out, that although the partie most numerous did vote in the first, yet the partie most considerable voted in the last sens, and which of these two did vote most wisely and justly; if I should take upon mee to determine, who am without doores, and not conscious to circumstances of State, nor intrusted with the management of publick affairs, it would in mine own judgment bee a very great presumption, and contrarie to the Rule, by which I walk in a conscientious submission to superior powers; for I make this my Rule, that my conscience is obliged to nothing, but to judg of mine own wales, how they may, within my calling bee made answerable to the will of God, by the Rules which hee hath given mee. Now I said, no Rule given by him to mee in my calling, which doth oblige mee to bee a definitive judg of these matters; so as to fasten them upon my conscience, that except I bee able to determine them, I may take no rest, nor intend the main duties of my profession. Nay, I finde a contrarie cleer Rule. That I must not bee a busie bodie in other men's affairs; That being free from all, I must become a servant to all, in that which is for edification; I must bee subject to superior powers, and not speak evil of Dignities; and that I must not suffer my conscience to bee brought under the power of worldlie and outward concernments; for I am told that all things are mine, therefore I must not bee brought under the power of any thing, but being bought with a price by the Lord, I must not bee (as to conscience) a servant of men; from which Rules I infer this, that, although I suppose all that is alleged, to bee so, as it is alleged; and all the presupposals to bee undoubted and certain, yet they must not reach, and come within mee so far, as to become a scruple to my conscience;

1 Pet. 4. 15.

1 Cor. 9. 19.

Tit. 3. 1.

Jude 3. 8.

1 Cor. 6. 12.

1 Cor. 3. 21, 22.

1 Cor. 7. 23, 24.

ence; and to make no doubt, whether yea or no, I should behave my self as a Subject, towards those that are my superiors; obeying Magistrates readily in everie good work, not speaking evil of them, nor brawling against them; but shewing all gentleness and meekness, both to them, and to all men, *Tit. 3. 1, 2.* I leav then the judicature of publick safetie to those that are in publick places: I praise to God for them; that they may bee inabled to judg aright, and to see their waie before them, and whether they do right or wrong in particular matters; I leav the judgment thereof unto God, and to their conscience; and look onely to mine own walking in my private sphere, to bee without blame, and to hold forth the word of life, and let the changes bee, what ever they will or may bee, in the states of this world, they shall no more trouble mee, if I remain my self, then the changes of the air, when the weather is sometimes fair, and sometimes foul: the storm that bloweth over my head shall not make mee stand still in the high waie, nor lie down in the puddle, not going forward till the journies end; as I am afraid, manie who are angrie at the changes of the times, beeing of a sullen humor, are readie to do, becaus they cannot get their wills; but I believ not that anie of your friends are such: yet I cannot saie, that all godlie men are free from the snare of such a distemper.

The second scruple is this; that, although no man can bee a judg in his own caus, and that although heretofore, both King and Parliament did appeal to the judgment of the people, to determine whether of their proceedings did most agree, to the preservation of Religion and Libertie, yet none are now thought competent judges of those actions, which have been don by such who are in power, but themselves; so that now all men are bound up, to yield a blinde obedience to those who have gotten the Government into their hands; and exercise it in an arbitrarie waie.

To this I saie, suppose all this be so, what then? then (saie your friends) the Engagement ought not to bee entered into, by which they will bee established in the use of this power: and this I take to bee the whole strength of this scruple also.

H

But

But hereunto I saie, that I dare not take upon mee, to censure them, so as your friends do in this scruple; and although the accusations which are alleged, should bee made out, to bee such crimes as they would make them to bee, and that I should see no plea left for them, whereby they might iustifie themselves; yet the consequence which your friends make thereupon, would not follow as to my conscience: for suppose the matters alleged to bee as ill, and their proceedings as irrational as may bee, and that they abuse their power, as is alleged; yet I saie, that it is not warrantable for mee to refuse the Engagement: if it require in my judgment, a thing in it self good, and lawful to bee don for common safetie; for the supposed faultineses of these men in their places; (whereof private men are not judges over them) cannot warrant mee to refuse the performance of a cleer and known dutie towards the publick in my place, which they may require of mee.

But your friends will saie perhaps to this: but if your entering into the Engagement will establish them in the power which they abuse, how can you do it with a good conscience? I answer, that whatever is a cleer master of dutie, ought for conscience sake to bee intended for it self without scrupling the event: becaus the future accidental effects, and contingent events of humane actions are wholly in Gods hand; nor can I know whether my taking of the Engagement shall establish them in the power, which they have or no: and if it doth, while I do nothing but my dutie, I must leav that to God. Your friends that argue thus; wee will not resolv to bee true and faithfull to the *Common-wealth*, as it is now established without a King and House of Lords, becaus, if wee do this, these men will bee confirmed in the places wherein they are, do not in this matter guid their resolution by a rule, but by a conjectural interest; and the forecast of some event, which they would, or would not have to fall out, which is not to follow, but to pre-determine Providence, a thing in our thoughts no wales

to bee allowed, and a thing which they condemn in others, and yet herein it's practised by themselves: for when they refuse thus to do a dutie upon this account, becaus happily these men will thereby bee established; they seem to mee to intend to oppose, and contradict Providence already determined; now whether Providence will establish these men, in the place whereof they are fully possessed, yea or no, is a thing that I am not to look after: I must leave that unto God, and intend nothing, but to follow in everie present action a cleer Rule; and if God will confirm them in their places, by my doing my dutie, why should I take upon mee, or settle in my thoughts to grudge at it, or to hinder that event? Shall I predetermine God's Counsell? Can I sale to him they ought not to bee confirmed? or shall I by the neglect of a dutie, endeavor to cast down those whom he hath set up? Is not this to follow them that seek for changes? wee may wish, and seek also for changes to the better; if by doing our dutie, wee have cause to conjecture that such a thing may fall out; but to the end that a change of publick affairs may fall out, to neglect a dutie is altogether unwarrantable; or to studie in hatred to some persons, to bring a change in the Government: is that which is forbidden; as I suppose, in the *Proverbs* by *Solomon*; as for mine own part, I freely declare, that I did not seek for the abolishment of Regal Government; but since God hath brought it about in his own wale; I am bound to *acquiesce*, and as I fought not to bring matters to this state by a change; so I shall not seek to bring matters from it again, by a new change; but I must by the rule of my place and calling, as a private man, resolve to do my dutie, in the settlement or unsettlement; which God doth give, what ever it is: so then you see, that if I must guide my conscience by a Rule, I must not measure the righteousness of my actions by the appearances of events, which I conjecture may follow thereupon, but by the precepts, which tell mee what is my dutie in my place at all times, in present, *hic & nunc*; nor must I look to other men's actions, by the construction

ons, which I, or others may make of them, but I must look unto mine own waie; that is, to that which God require's of mee, in my private station. This your friends seem not to do, when they argue thus: wee will not take the Engagement, becaus wee will not confirm, but rather disturb these men in their places: this to my understanding, is to make conscience depend upon a design, and not upon the observation of a rule, in reference to a present dutie; now I dare not fasten anie humane design upon my conscience, nor make my conscience subject to anie thing, but to a cleer Rule of God's word: therefore, except the argument were proposed unto mee thus: *You must not take the Engagement, becaus the action required in it, is in it self unlawful to bee don, by you in your place; except (I saie) it were thus offered unto mee, I can see no just plea to pretend conscience in the business; if then nothing to my judgment bee required of mee, which is unlawful for mee to bee don, in my place and calling; I must bee so far from pretending conscience, for not engaging thereunto; that I dare not for conscience sake, but bee engaged heartily; By reason of the universal, and undeniable Rule, Rom. 13. 1. Let all souls bee subject to the bigger powers; becaus the powers that are, are of God; and again, vers 5. You must needs bee subject for conscience sake.* Thus then my conscience is not to bee subjected to the consequence, which your friends make; but unto this Rule of the word; although I should grant, that the premises, upon which they infer it to bee true: but if, when I look upon the Premises in themselves, and by the judgment of discretion, finde them to bee such, as may bee meer mistakes, and misrepresentations of things, or at least great uncertainties, which I ought not to take upon mee to determine, then I am abundantly cleered in the matter, that I ought not to bee scrupled at the things alleged, as they are; nor do I think, that your friends, if they understood themselves rightly, would suffer their conscience to bee scrupled at such considerations as these are; for if the Question bee concerning the actions of these men that now govern, whether

whether anie can or may judg of them definitively, besides themselves; the answer must bee, as I conceiv, that if they are the higher powers, from whom none can appeal; then it followeth undeniably, that none can, or may judg of their proceedings but themselves. The supreme government; that is, the Law-making power (which no man looking upon them, can denie them to bee posselt off) cannot bee accountable unto anie, but unto God: and if you will make them judges of their own proceedings, you must name som to bee over them, able to call them to an account: but if none such can bee found; then wee must understand this Rule, that no man is a competent Judg of his own actions, *cum grano salis*: viz. of a single man, viz. that none is to bee made the sole, and supreme judg of his own caus, and actions, but that hee ought to bee accountable thereof unto others, becaus no single man on earth, is either by the Law of nature, or by God's appointment made onely for himself, or to bee without doing service unto others; and therefore by other's, to whom hee is appointed to do service, hee may bee judged, and is bound to give them an account of his stewardship; but in case a state, or whole nation by it's representatives, which by it self is free, and depend's upon none but God, doth contract it self into a Bodie, to whom it doth intrust it's whole power; this Bodie can bee accountable unto none, but unto God; nevertheless, each member of the Bodie is accountable unto the whole; onely the whole, as long as it hath the power, cannot bee called to an account of their proceedings by anie; elf there would bee a *processus in infinitum*, or this absurditie would follow, that the supreme power would bee subject to it's Inferior, that is no supreme, which is, *contradictio in adjecto*; it follow's then, that where a Nation doth intrust the supremacie of their power, so to anie societie of men, that they can do with it what they think good, there none can bee judges of their actions definitively but themselves; elf the judges and governors, which are actually supreme, would have Superiors over them, which is absurd. Potentially

tially the Supremacie is in the collective Bodie of a Nation; but actually it can bee no where, but in the representatives of the whole; and so long as the trust of the whole is in their hands, so long they must bee allowed to bee sole judges of their proceedings.

As for that which is said, that both King and Parliament did appeal to the people's judgment, to determine, whether of their proceedings did agree most with the preservation of Religion; and Liberties of the Subject; I grant they did so; but their meaning was not by so doing, to set up everie private man above themselves, as a definitive judge of the whole matter; but onely to justify their proceedings to the judgment of discretion, in everie man, that hee might for his own good, bee inclined to favor the cause, which should seeme in his eyes most just; from this appeal, of both King and Parliament to the people, may bee gathered by the wale; First, that all Superiours are som waie accountable to the bodie of the Nation, of their administrations, and of the Reasons of their proceedings. Secondly, that all particular men may take notice, by the judgment of discretion, of the proceedings of their Superiours, to swaie their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence in things required of them in their places. Thirdly, that no Superiours ought to think themselves so absolute, as not to bee bound, to declare the grounds of their actions, that they may bee understandingly weighed by their inferiours, for whose sake they manage publick affairs. From these grounds then, let mee offer to your discretion, that which I think rational, and tending to Peace, that seeing the Trustees of the Nation have disagreed amongst themselves, and those that had the Supremacie of power in their hand, have determined matters, according to the abilitie which God gave them; it is lawful for mee in my place, to look upon matters so far, as I discern them, to make the best thereof; but it is not lawful, nor conscionable, for mee to judge definitively of their proceedings, to make the worst thereof.

You see then, that I cannot in conscience charge these men,

men, that have the Government in their hand, with that which your friends judg them guiltie of. *viz.* First, that all men are made to yield a blinde obedience unto them; I cannot saie so: for I see that they offer to all men, an account of their proceedings, and that they have carried on their resolutions rationally, according to emergencies, and are not unwilling to shew the reasons of their proceedings, to such as enquire after the same. Secondly, that they have the Government without the people's consent: I cannot saie so; for I believ, that all that are in place, were chosen to their places by the free consent of the people. Thirdly, that they exercise their power more arbitrarily then the King did, in som sens I cannot saie so, and yet in another sens I may saie so. I may not saie so in the sens that your friends mean it, who I suppose, make all arbitrarie power as in the King, so in them equally unlawful. I may not saie so; becaus I am not a judg, either of him, or of them in their particular actings, and yet again, I may saie, that I conceiv it lawful in them to exercise an arbitrarie power, which was not lawful in the King to do, becaus their trust from the Bodie of the Nation is above that, which was given to the King; and the whole power which hee had, did primarily belong unto them, as they were representatives of the Nation, who upon emergencie, have seen caus to resume it; and of this they have given an account to the bodie collective; so then, although it is their right, as supreme in the Bodie, to do things arbitrarily; yet I cannot saie, that they intend to rule without Law, as it was imagined the King intended, by opposing the Law-making power of the Representatives, or that they intend to oblige all men, to yield a blinde obedience; for where Laws are made, and accounts given of publick proceedings; there men cannot bee justly said to bee obliged, to yield a blinde obedience; and thus you see, wherefore I am not staggered, at the second scruple of your friends.

The third matter here proposed, is not a scruple, but a complaint, with a suspicious conjecture of their intentions

tions concerning Religion ; that they seem not to bee willing to advance it , becaus they punish not blasphemers, and sinners against the light of nature , so much as those that take not the Engagement ; to this I shall saie ; that it is my dutie to mourn, for the abominations committed within *Jerusalem* ; to praise to God for a remedie against them , to warn, and admonish those that are in place of them ; to encourage them to do their dutie towards the publick, and towards my self , by doing my dutie in all things good and lawful towards them ; and when I have don this, I must leav the event unto God ; but if I will take up jealousies against them , becaus everie thing which I would have don, in publick by them , is not don , as I would have it ; and upon my private jealousies, I licentiate my self , not to do my dutie in my place towards them , and make others rebellious against them ; and in my heart depose them from their places ; then I weaken their hands , and hinder them , what in mee lieth from doing even that , which I complain is not don by them ; and so make my self accessarie to the guilt of that evil, which I laie unto their charge ; and so, while's I accuse them , of the neglect of their dutie, to the publick , I neglect mine own dutie, both to my self , and to them, and to the publick, and abstract them also from doing their's.

The last matter here offered is the consideration of *Rom.* 13. where your friends saie , that it is not to bee understood of usurped powers, and you give mee their grounds, why they think so ?

As for mine own part, I cannot call to minde, that any where I have said, nor do I remember, that ever I was of opinion to saie : that the place is to bee understood of usurped powers ; but I conceiv , it is to bee understood indefinitely, of the powers which are in place, what ever they are , whether usurped or not ; if they bee the higher powers ; for the words which the Apostle doth use, signifie nothing elf ; but that which is proper to a supreme Magistrate, implying nothing, either of usurpation, or lawful election to the place ; but onely of a beeing in it, of the ground

being in it of the ground of that being; as it is from God, of the Acts proper to the being in the place, and of the ends of those acts; and the duties of Subjects to be performed towards them in reference to all this. I saie not then that the Apostle doth intend to perswade us, to obeie usurped powers; but hee doth declare, what wee ought to do, as Christians in submission to the powers that are over us; that is, to those that bear Rule: for the words used by the Apostle are indefinite *ἐξουσίαι ὑποτάχοντες* vers 1. and *ἀρχαί*. vers 3. these denominations determine nothing concerning the matter of usurpation, or a lawfull calling to their places; they implie onely three things. *Viz.* First, the Notion of power, or force in *ἐξουσία*. Secondly the notion of eminencie, or superioritie possessed, in *ὑποτάχοντες*. Thirdly, the notion of acting above others, or before others, in *ἀρχαί*. So then, the object of our submission is indefinitely the *might*, which is possessed of the superioritie, which is above us: and doth act in a waile of Government over us. Of these mights, or mightie ones, the Apostle saith indefinitely, that none of them have their place of Superioritie, or their *might* but of God; and whatever superioritie or might is in being, is ordained of God so to be, over those that are in subjection to it; and therefore none ought to resist the superior powers, that are over them for Government, because the Governors, or Magistrates are not a terror to good works, but to the evil; and this I take to be the cleer sens of vers 1, 2, 3. If then the Apostle speake's of Magistrates, or Magistracie indefinitely, not reflecting upon the particular waile, how they enter upon their places; but onely upon the actual possession thereof: and in that respect will have us to look upon them, as such whom God appoint's to be obeyed in things that are good; I know not why wee should trouble our selves further, then the Holie Ghost doth give us cause, by limiting and defining the title and right of the powers, into lawfull and unlawful, with reference to their entrance therein, according to humane Laws and customs; whereof in all this

I

Scripture

Scripture there is no intimation at all; nor was it then, nor is it now possible, for private Christians (to whom the Apostle writes) to judge of the lawfulness of the titles, of those that are in place; to the power which they have; but hee refer's them onely to that which was apparent, and whereof none could pretend ignorance, viz. to the powers which were actually over them, to rule them; these then as such, are to bee respected as the object of our submission; and this is cleerly Calvin's minde, lib. 4. Instit. cap. 18. parag. 24. till the end; where hee make's the office of Magistracie to bee the thing to bee respected by all; although men com to the possession of it by means, and waies never so unjust, and do nothing less, then what become's their places; for the unjust acquisition of a place, although it is a sin in him, who com's unjustly by it; yet it derogate's nothing from that which is due to the place, that is, the office according to God's appointment; for the office is his ordinance, and hee will have all soules to bee subject to it, in good things: els wee set up Anarchie.

Now if your friends will without prejudice look upon these things; they will perceiv, that higher powers and rulers are to bee look't upon onely, as men in the office of Magistrates, and as such, to bee obeyed: and this being granted, it will follow, whatever their personal faults may bee, that yet, so long as they are in the office of Magistracie; they are to bee submitted unto in all good things; whether then they are usurpers or no, that is not material to my conscience; this Apostolical Rule binde's mee to respect the ordinance of God, which is the Ruler in his Office; to him, as such, I owe submission, nor am I to judge of anie thing further. By all which you may see, how I shall answer your friend's objections, which tend to shew, that the higher powers in Rom. 13. cannot bee meant of usurped powers; that is, of men com to the place of Government, by waies of usurpation; I shall saie to this, that the Apostle doth not expresse anie thing at all of this, and therefore wee may not assert, that hee meant anie such thing;

thing; nor doth hee expresse anie thing to exclude usurpers, from having the title of higher powers; but his words, to my understanding, are indefinitely appliable to all, that are in the Office of supreme power; whether they bee usurpers, or no: therefore it is not that which is to bee look't upon; but if they bee high and Ruling powers, they are to bee regarded, as the Apostle doth enjoin, and for the reasons hee doth allege.

As for the Arguments brought in to shew that usurpers of the higher power cannot bee included in the denomination, which the Apostle give's to Magistrates here, I conceive them far short of which they intend to prove.

To the first I shall saie, that God's providence can have no Rule but his will; and it is no incongruities, to saie, that God hath but one rule of ordering all things; which is the Rule of Righteousness. Whether then hee appoint's plagues and famines; or blessings, and plentiful seasons; and whether hee give's good and bad Magistrates; usurpers, or lawfully called ones; all is don by the same rule of common providence, which is God's just and holie will. Nor is this at all ill for the Autoritie and credit of Magistracie to bee thus appointed: for the highest autoritie is the supremacie of God's will; whose wisdom saith, *by mee Kings reign, and Princes decree Justice*, Prov. B. 15. and the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever hee will; and setteth up over it the basest of men, Dan. 4. 17. I shall confesse, that as to men by the Principles of natural societie, God hath settled Rules for Government, and for men to bee placed in Government; and so the Autoritie and credit of Magistracie is built upon another basis, as to us, then, that which doth bring Calamities and plagues upon us, which com immediately from common providence, but that this man comes to the Government, either conformably, or not conformably, to those humane Rules of election, is immediately from God; and no disparagement at all to the office, and the respect due unto it, becaus hee hath given expresse Rules, both

In the word, and in the nature of man, by which it is to bee upheld amongst men; and herein the autoritie of Magistracie is differenced from plagues and calamities, and not in the reference, which it hath to common Providence; for by commons Providence all things have but one Rule, God's righteous will in judgment and loving kindness.

To the second, which saith, that *the powers here spoken of, must not bee resisted, but (saie your friends) usurpers may bee resisted, as Athalia was, these must bee maintained by paying of tribute, usurpers not so.* I saie, that it is not lawful for anie private man, to whom the Apostle write's to resist the higher powers over him, whether the persons bee usurpers or no; nor is hee to make himself a judg of usurpation; but hee is to bee subject to the powers, that are in place and rule: As for *Athalia*, shee was not resisted by anie private, but by publick autoritie; for *Jehoiada* the high Priest, and the *Sanhedrim* was a publick autoritie; and by the Law of Nature, being the King's Tutor and Protector, hee was authorized to depose and execute the usurper; as for the assertion, that lawful Magistrates must bee maintained by paying tribute, but usurpers not so; I saie, that the dutie of paying tribute is enjoined to Subjects towards Majestates *quod* Magistrates; and not *quod* lawful Magistrates; and consequently, it is not lawful for anie to refuse tribute upon this ground, because hee doth judg him to bee an usurper, who doth demand it; if hee doth finde him, in the place and office of a Magistrate, and if no law of nature, or Nations, or of God is contrarie to what is demanded; hee is bound to paie tribute, as to a Magistrate indefinitely, without this, or that respect to his personal qualities.

The third objection saith; that lawful power is onely God's ordinance, and not usurped. This is to beg the Question: for God's Providence doth order the acts of usurpation (in themselves as to men unlawful) to a good end; and the Magistracie still remain's his ordinance, although seated in an usurper; and the highest power of might, which none can have, but by his giving of it,

in his ordinance, although an usurper hath the management of it: Christ tel's *Pilate*, when hee spoke of his power or might, to save or condemn him, that hee could do nothing in that kinde, except it were given him from above; God for judgment, give's and appoint's power to bee in the hands of Tyrants: they manage it unjustly, and in due time are punished for it; yet that Supremacie of power, in their hand, doth not ceas to bee an ordinance of God. It is true, that the sons of *Aaron* had another manner of ordination, then *Korah* and his companie; for *Korah* and his companie were never permitted to have the Priesthood; but if God had not punished them, but permitted them upon the plea, which they used to have managed the Priesthood, aswel as the service of the Tabernacle, and that they had been in a peaceable possession of the office, what respect would then have been due unto them is a doubt unto mee; which I am not able, I confess suddenly to determine; for I finde that Christ in his daies, did respect the Autoritie of the High-Priest; although hee was but annual; and came into his place by another waie, then God at first appointed *Aaron* and his sons to that office; Briberie, faction and politick practices had brought the office of the High-Priest, to bee annual and changeable, in respect of the men that had it, who perhaps, in those daies could not bee excused from usurpation upon one another; and yet the office was to bee respected in their hand, and look't upon as God's Ordinance; the personal faults of men make not void the appointment of God.

To the fourth I saie, that all men, whom God doth anie waie imploye, are in som sens his Ministers; the original word is *Didasce*, which is a servant; and whoever hath the place of an officer under God, is rightly called his servant; and none can have it; but by som waie of calling from God himself, either ordinarie, or extraordinarie: it follow's not therefore, that usurpers may not bee called God's servants; *Nebuchadnezzar* an usurper, is called God's servant by the Prophet; hee that doth service, and is imployed by a master to do it, is a servant; all Tyrants

Job. 19. 10, 11.

Jer. 25. 9.

in the world are imployed for judgment, and all usurpers of power are under a Master, that is, higher then the highest, who make's use of them for the welfare of his people; for although wee count not punishments our welfare, yet certainly in God's hand they are for the good of his people, and they execute the wrath which God hath appointed against evil doers; and this wrath they execute by virtue of their office. For God appoint's them to the office, that they should take vengeance of evil doers, as *Jehu* was appointed against the house of *Abah*, in an extraordinary court.

The last Argument alleged to prove, that no usurpers can bee meant by higher powers in *Rom. 13.* is taken from a supposed inconvenient consequence, which is, that if Levellers, Papists, or Malignants should get the power, and become the supreme Rulers, wee should bee obliged to obey them as the powers that are of God; whereunto I can saie no more but this; that it would indeed bee a sad case, if God should dispose of the Supremacie of power into such hands; but if hee should for a judgment over this state bee pleased so to do, I know none other rule for private men to behave themselves by, but this which the Apostle doth prescribe; for if the Turk were my supreme Magistrate, and my lot did fall to bee under his civil Government, I would think my self bound, in things good and lawfull, to submit unto him; the Reformed Churches in *France* are under a Papist Magistrate: yet they refuse not to submit in things good and lawfull; If God give the Kingdom to the basest of men, and set mee under him, I woud not saie, because hee is base, that therefore his power is not of God.

Thus I have after a long delate found som time, to offer your friends these thoughts for their satisfaction, the three first scruples I had answered above a moneth ago; the last which relates to *Rom. 13.* I intended to have answered by a full, and demonstrative Analysis of that whole context, which I had begun to make, but being severally interrupted with som other occasions, I did yesterday alter my resolution,

resolution, and have added to that, which was don so long ago; what you finde here, in answer to the fourth scruple: the Lord direct us in all truth, and teach us to discern the things that are most excellent; I rest, and desire you to remember mee to your friends, as beeing

S James's
17. Julie 1650.

Your affectionate and faithfull
Servant in Christ.

JOHN DUNN.

The fourth Letter.

Reverend Sir!

I Received yours of the 17th of Julie, for which I must acknowledge my self obliged unto you, that you are pleased still to continue your labor of love, and care to give satisfaction to such, as desire it in a loving waie. The end of my answer at this time is to let you know that your Letter and Books came safely to my hands, and to return you manie thanks for both of them, which I have already communicated to som friends, and shall do to others. I will not seek to create you anie more trouble, by raising up anie new scruples, about those things you delivered in your letter, but onely briefly acquaint you with their success, with som that I acquainted with them: Som think, that if what you hold forth about that place, Rom. 13. will hold firm, it will bee a sufficient ground of satisfaction, for yielding obedience to the present powers. Neither doth the engaging to do it much trouble them; if they should oblige themselves to do it onely in a passive, not in an active waie: but they conceive, that by taking the engagement to bee faithfull to the present government, they binde themselves, not onely to bee subject to them in all lawful things; but to oppose, and resist anie other, to whom (as they in their conscience think) the right of Government doth truly belong, when ever it shall bee claimed.

Secondly, Others that are truly godlie, think, that what you
speak

Speak about the rule of being guided by the major part (that it is not alway the best and safest waie) holds true in rebus moralibus, but not in rebus politicis, els the foundation of all government will bee overthrowne; if in such things as are to bee determined by Votes of diuers persons, the major part may not carrie it.

Thirdly, They think, that what you saie in answer to the second scruple about judging (namely, that all particular men may take notice by the judgment of discretion, of the proceedings of their superiors, to waite their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence; in things required of them in their places; these being your words make's much for them, for in the judgment of discretion, they conceiv, that the setting up of themselves to bee the supreme, and sole higher powers of the Nation, and excluding others (to whom a right therein did properly belong, aswell as to themselves) without the consent of the Kingdom, is not agreeable to the right rule, and therefore they dare not concur with them in doing, or approving of it, (as they shall do, if they take the Engagement) other doubts might bee mentioned, but I will not bee tedious; I finde that the Treatise of the Lancastier-Ministers about the Engagement, seem's to bee of great weight and strength with manie good men, if a cleer answer could bee given, to what therein is most substantial, it would give great satisfaction. I do most freely and feelingly assent to what you saie, and acknowledge that it is God's peculiar work, to make the wilderness of our spiritual estate a pool of waters, and to turn the drie land into waterie springs: to him therefore I desire to look, humbly imploring him, (who is the Father of lights) so to inform our judgments, that wee may bee able to see, and discern the things that differ, and to compose our affections, that wee may both entertaine everie truth in love, and embrace one another in love, not giving waie to anie groundless prejudice, which may bee an hindrance of either of these. And go on still (good sir) to bee the unchangeable, constant, and single-hearted peace-maker, not suffering your self to bee discouraged by anie misapprehensions, that som (though good men) may have of you, for bee that seeth the heart, and tryeth the reins, will in due time recompens what ever is don in truth of heart, for preserving of the unittie of the spirit in the bond of peace.

In particular, bee not wearie (as occasion serv's) in seeking to allay the heat of indignation, that is stirred up in som in high place, against those that dare not venture upon the Engagement, (though forbearing upon grounds truly conscientious.) Our good God give unto all that fear him, that they may once com, to bee of one heart, and one waie, and all agree in that waie, which is most agreeable to his will and word.

this 16th of August
1650.

Your most affectionate, and
most obliged Brother, and
Servant in love.

The Answer to the fourth Letter.

Reverend Sir!

YOur's of the sixteenth of *August* was delivered unto mee the three and twentieth thereof; after which daie, I had occasion to go into the Countrie, which took mee off from these thoughts, almost ever since; but now I am returned unto them, to let you know, that the expressions of love in your Letter, and the encouragements which you give mee, to proceed in the waie wherein I am, are no small refreshments unto my spirit, and a support against the obloquies and reproaches, which I meet withal in the mouths of others: whose blisfaed affections will not suffer them to look upon mee without prejudice: so that they cannot discern, in anie waie that simplicitie, by which I endeavor; as to offer my self to all men, so to approve my conscience before God. But som comfort I have, that this is no new thing unto mee; for all along, my lot hath been more or less, to bee misunderstood by all, and thus to bee look't upon a squint by one partie or another: be-
K caus,

cauf, although I could not but approve alwaies in ſom things, one partie more then another, and conſequently, for the main I did own them, as thoſe amongſt whom I was to bee reckoned; yet I never did own them as a partie, or in their partiſhips: but ſet my minde to cure them of the diſtempers, which proceed from the ſpirit of envie and jealousie, which dwel's in our fleſh. Therefore ſo far as I underſtood my freedom in the ſpirit, I never was, nor ever ſhall bee (I hope) reſtrained from making uſe of all parties, and owning them in that which is good and conſonant to the truth of Chriſtianitie.

I thank you for the account you are pleaſed to give mee of the ſucceſs, which the papers I ſent you have had with ſom; one of the chief aims which I have in this buſineſs (next unto the diſcoverie of Truth, to unite our ſpirits therein, and give ſatisfaction to thoſe who are ſcrupled) is to engage the affections of godlie men, upon the thoughts of mutual forbearance, and compliance by ſhewing, that as there is no cauſ of fundamental diſiſion, between thoſe that differ in judgment, about the preſent civil tranſactions; ſo there ought not to bee anie ſuch diſtance of affections, as to produce anie unwillingneſs of being reconciled to each other; or of being reunited in the proſecution of their main deſign, which is a Goſpel-Reformation of this Nation: to oblige therefore holie men to entertain the thoughts, which may lead them to this aim, is one of the cauſes, which make's mee ſo willing to bee larger upon this ſubject, then otherwiſe I would bee; for what is it to mee, whether I ſtand under the government of one man, or of manie; if I can either waile fulfil my race with jole, and ſerv my Generation in the advancement of the Kingdom of the Lord Jeſus? whatever Government then God doth ſet over mee, I look upon it, and upon my dutie in it, with a reference, and ſubordination unto this aim; nor is it at all lawful for mee, by anie humane Engagement whatſoever, to abridge my ſelf of this libertie, or to foreſial my ſelf in this reſolution: ſo that I ſhould bee obliged to ſcruple

ple the performance of anie Christian duties for publick edification, more in a Common-wealth, then in a Monarchie, or *vice versa*: or that I may not (when God so call's the ballance of humane affairs) determine it to bee my right, to live aswel under the one Government, as under the other, walking in Peace and Truth towards all men inoffensively. In effect by the scanning of matters relating to this subject, I finde that I am fallen upon a branch of the studie of Peace, which heretofore, in the pursuit thereof I never did reflect upon so directly: for in former times my direct aim was to minde onely the Rules of religious Peace and unitie amongst the professors of the Gospel, in reference to Christianitie; but now I have been carried on to minde also the Rules, by which a Christian is obliged to behave himself peaceably, in civil and outward relations; which is, and will bee a necessarie point of knowledge, as wee are in the flesh, and as long as *Babylon* is not fallen, and the *New Jerusalem*, the mother of usall, is not com down from above. I have therefore caus'to thank God, that as I have not been led forth by anie worldlie end, in meddling with this Subject; So I have learned thereby, somewhat more of the waies of Peace, then ever I knew before. And that I may benefit my self by the occasion which you offer unto mee in your last; although you oblige mee not to tell you my sent, of that which your friends conceiv of my last answers to their doubts, yet I shall briefly take into consideration, the thoughts which you have expressed of theirs, concerning som passages of my discours.

The first is concerning active obedience, to bee yielded unto the present powers, which upon the ground of *Rom. 13.* I think may cleerly bee made out; but they conceiv (as you saie) that by taking the Engagement to bee faithful to the present Government, they binde themselves not onely to bee subject unto them in all lawful things; but to oppose, and resist anie other, to whom (as they in their conscience think) the right of Government doth truly belong; when ever it shall bee obtained.

I conceive, that the sent of the Engagement cannot ratio-

nally otherwise bee understood; then as the autors thereof in the Aſt, by which it is impoſed upon all, do explain their meaning; and conſcionably it may, and ought to bee underſtood none otherwiſe, then as it containeth a cleer dutie preſcribed in the word of God: nor can anie man, as a Chriſtian, intend to bee obliged otherwiſe unto it, then as it is in it ſelf, and ſo far as it is to him a dutie; nor ought anie man (that will not injure his Superiors in hiſthoughts) imagine, that it is impoſed by them in anie other ſenſ, then as it is ſuch a dutie; if godlie men therefore ſhould minde in ſimplicitie themſelves, and their own duties, what need they ſet ſtumbling blocks in their own waie, by conjectural interpretations of things; which they conceive contrarie to dutie in others? Is not this a ſubtil corruption of nature to bee ſo inclined; and a weakneſſe of ſpirit to do ſo? and if wee repreſent things ſo to our ſelves, that wee becom thereby diſaffected to our own dutie, becauſe wee are willing to conceive that ſomething undutiful in others, may follow thereupon; do wee not deceive our ſelves with the poſſibilitie of another's failing, in time to com, to make it a pretence to cover our own preſent failing? for it it bee our preſent dutie, to becom faithful to the powers that are over us, by doing things good and lawful under them; to what purpoſe is it to foreſtal our thoughts with a thing, which wee cannot ſaie is; or which wee know not, whether it ever ſhall bee; viz. whether our Superiors will oppoſe anie, to whom the right of Government doth truly belong? They that are in the full poſſeſſion of power, are under God, at this time, our onely Superiors and Governors: nor is it lawful for mee at preſent to have anie relation, and therefore I ought not to have anie reſpect unto others; for it is cleerly my dutie, in my ſphere, to obſerv with a ſingle heart the relation, under which by God's appointment I ſtand at preſent; nor am I to meddle with anie thing elf, as a matter of conſcience, but with the obſervation of the Rule, *Let all ſouls bee ſubieſt to the ſuperior powers, and the powers that are, are ordained of God, Rom. 13.* If then I take upon mee,

to make it a matter of conscience to think, that the right of government in chief, doth truly belong to others, then to these that are in place; do not I depose them in my heart, and make my self the judge of their supremacie? and if I suppose that they do oppose, or will oppose those, to whom I have adjudged the supreme Right; do not I renounce the qualitie of a Subject, and of a private man, by taking upon mee, to determine the highest controversie in our humane affairs, which is, to whom the Right of Government in this state doth belong; and how I should bee able, to warrant in my self (who am in no place) and to my conscience before God, this usurpation of Judicature over my Superiors, (who are undeniably in the full possession of all places of Judicature) while I accuse them of another kinde of usurpation, I am not able to imagine: for there is no Rule, either of God or man, that make's them subject to my tribunal. I would therefore intreat your friends in the fear of God, to examine the ground, and consider conscionably by what Rule, they dare take upon them to engage their conscience thus, to think, that the right of Government doth truly belong to anie other, then to the present Parliament, which is possessed therewith. This presupposall of their's, determining the right to another, not onely beg's the Question in debate; but contain's a high charge against all the Parliamentarie proceedings hitherto, prosecuted against the King's attempts, to rule without Law; It bewraie's therefore not onely a great deal of presumption, but much unadvisedness of Conscience, to cast themselves thereby into a snare of disobedience; and the State wherein they live, into all unsettlement and confusion. For private men, if they should bee made judges of publick quarrels: and obliged in conscience, to yield no active obedience towards the maintenance of the settlement, which is in being under their Superior powers, except the ground of the quarrel bee referred to them to determine, it is not possible that there could bee anie settlement in a State at all; therefore private men are not to answer for the grounds of the

quarrels, which may bee between their own supreme powers, and others that pretend to the same Dignitie; but all that they are obliged unto, is, by lawful means in their places, to defend and maintein in peace, the settlement which is in being, and to act with their Rulers to that effect.

The second is, touching the Rule of being guided by the major part; where it is granted, that *in rebus moralibus* my rule held true, but not in *rebus Politicis*; else (saie they) the foundation of all Government will bee overthrowen, if in things to bee determined by Votes of divers persons, the Major part may not carrie it.

I said in matters of extraordinarie concernment, a Minor part is not to bee bound by the Votes of a Major part; hereunto your friends seem to agree so far, as matters are Moral, but not as they are Political; what they mean properly by Political, I do not well know; but I meant matters of Government, which relate unto the fundamental constitution of safetie and libertie; which are alwaies either materially, or formally complicated with Moral Duties, or els immediately depending upon the same; but in lesser matters, which relate not unto the grounds of libertie and safetie, which perhaps your friends call *Politica*, I consent with them, that the Major part should carrie it; and that all rational men should for peace sake, yield in things not worth a great contest: as in matters of meer order, what is to bee don, or taken into consideration first, or last: in matters of circumstance, relating to forms of actions, to times and places, and to the manner of proceeding, which doth not alter the substance of things morally good: and in particular municipal constitutions, which have no influence upon the whole state of a Common-wealth; in all such things the Major part should binde the Minor to a concurrence, lest all the grounds of Societie bee dissolved; but when the business relates unto the main end, and chief grounds of publick safetie and freedom, then although the thing to bee settled may bee called Political, in respect of the State for which
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it is desired; yet it will alwaies bee found in respect of the obligation, which thereby will bee brought upon the course of particular men's lives, a matter of moralitie.

The third thing which you mention, is their sense of my Answer to the second scruple, concerning the judgment of discretion, how far, and to what end, private men may make use of it; here I finde in them, either a mistake of the Notion, which I have of the judgment of discretion, or else a misapplication thereof, in respect of the limits, how far it is to bee extended, or of the end and use for which it is allowed. To cleer their thoughts, I shall desire them to take notice, that, by the judgment of discretion, I mean a rational, free, and disingaged surveying of things, which offer themselves to our consideration, about matters whereof wee may lawfully make enquire; with an eye of indifferencie to make some discoveries, but may not make anie absolute and final determination thereof; so as to oblige our Conscience to follow the result of our discoveries: for wee may lawfully enquire further then wee may define; and it may bee profitable and advantagious for us, as to the manner of doing our duties, to make discoveries of the wales of those, towards whom in those Duties wee do relate; and yet not necessarie for us, as to the performance of the main of the Dutie on our part, to define anie thing by those discoveries concerning them. For herein the judgment of discretion, and the definitive judgment of Conscience differ in my Notion; that the one is necessarie in reference to our selves, and is to bee absolute about matters, relating properly to our own sphere of activitie, wherein there is a cleer Rule for everie man to determine, what is his Dutie: but the other is free and voluntarie in reference to others, and is to bee alwaies conditional, about matters relating properly to the sphere of other men's activitie; wherein, although the general rule of dutie may bee known, yet the particular circumstances of fact being unknown, no settled judgment can bee made of the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of their proceedings; and therefore no consequences may bee drawn

drawn from the discoveries made, concerning other men's actions, whereof wee cannot bee judges, to define matters of dutie concerning our selvs: becaus nothing of dutie, relating to our selvs in our places, can bee suspended upon the doubtful circumstances of other men's actings in their places.

From all which you may perceiv, what bounds I set to the judgment of discretion, viz.

First, that it must rise from our rational facultie, and not from our Conscience, that is, the motive which should put us upon the exercising of this judgment, must not bee a tie of Conscience to resolv a scruple; but a rational contemplation of that, which may bee advantageous to our understanding; by the discoverie of those properties of things, which occur to us in our waie, which will inable us to make good use thereof.

Secondly, that the object of the judgment of Discretion must bee things without, and not things within; for things within, if they bee our own, wee are bound to judg these definitively; but if they bee the secrets of other men, wee must leav them to the judgment of him, that will reveal the hidden things of darknes: as for things without, which others do act; wee are to look upon them discreetly, and with a limitation, upon certain conditions; leaving the definitive sentence thereof to the judgment of the great daie.

Thirdly, that the judgment of discretion is onely to bee intended to the circumstantialls of matters. to make a true discoverie thereof; and not to the substantialls, to prie beyond our line, into the secrets and main concernments of other men, as busie bodies in other men's matters.

As for the end and use, for which the judgment of discretion is to bee allowed, I conceiv thus.

1. It is to bee exercised to inable us, to discern probably, what the nature and propertie of things are, which from without are incident to us in our waie, as offered from others: that wee may difference that which is useful, from that which is useles; lest wee mistake the one for the
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the other, in that application, which wee shall have occasion to make thereunto.

2. That it is to bee exercis'd, to keep our spirit in the use of our Libertie; so, as neither to fall under the bondage of an implicite credulitie, to believ everie thing that is told us; nor to take too much upon us, as magisterial Judges, or controlers of men, or things not within our line; but discreetly to ballance our thoughts, between a slavish belief, and a busie prying into, and censoriousness of other men's affairs.

3. That the result of It must not bee to regulate the main of our course, thereby either in our own place, or towards others; but onely to help us in the manner of proceeding, to do things more completely, and satisfactorie to our own reason, and the edification of others; it must not therefore giue us the rule of that, which is, or is not to bee don in our places; but it may discover unto us, that which may tend to the *bene* or *melius esse*, thereof in reference to others.

These Notions I laie open to your friends, that they may perceiv their mistake in the consequence, which they infer upon my words, whereby they confound the judgment of discretion, with that which is definitive; and misapplie the former to the object of the later: for because I saie, that *particular men may by the judgment of discretion, take notice of the actions of their Superiors, to swaie their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence in things required of them in their places*; they conclude (as they conceiv) by the judgment of discretion, that, *what the present powers have don, in settling themselves in the Supremacie, is not agreeable to the rule of righteousness: wherefore (saie they) they dare not concur in doing, or approving of it, as they shall do, if they take the Engagement.*

To this conclusion, I saie it follow's not upon my assertion; but that they mistake the nature, and the use of the judgment of discretion; and misapplie it to make up an absolute definition of a thing, which is not within the line of their Judicature; for they determine upon the whole

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matter; that the superiority of their Rulers is unjust; whereas discretion and conscience, both should teach them not to determine anie thing of so high a nature; onely they might modestly take leav to make a rational search into the circumstances, and a discoverie of probabilities alleged *in utramque partem, pro & contra*; Nor should that discoverie, how probable soever it may seem on either side, become a ground to bottom the main of their dutie upon; but it should onely serv to swaie their resolutions, to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence, in things required of them in their places. By things required of them in their places, I mean particular matters, which are to bee don in order to their main and known dutie, which is to bee subject to superior powers, in all good things, and by a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence therein, I mean an intelligent discerning of our waie, in respect of the manner, how to act, or not to act with others therein, for the publick good, so as may bee most advantagious, and acceptable to these, towards whom, and with whom the action is to bee intended; therefore when they reflect upon the present powers, in reference to their Supremacie; so as to saie, that in their judgment of discretion, they finde, that what the powers have don for their settlement, is not agreeable to righteousness; they judg not discreetly, but rashly; because they indiscreetly applie their thoughts to an object, which is beyond the line, and against the use of the judgment of discretion; and furthermore, upon this their indiscreet judgment of that, whereof they they are not made judges; they infer as indiscreet a conclusion; for they saie, therefore they dare non-concur in approving of the proceedings, by which their Superiors are com to bee settled in the Supremacie: as they think they shall do, if they take the Engagement: here they having misapplied their judgment to a wrong object, they act not discreetly, but definitively about it: for they saie, they dare not concur in approving of what their Superiors have don; but who doth require this approbation at the hand of their Conscience? For that onely should teach them
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what to dare, or not to dare : and it would bee well, if such as dare not concur in approving, should also not dare to concur, in disapproving what they have don : but when they have defined the matter to bee unrighteous, contrarie to the law of discretion ; and then saie, that therefore they dare not concur to approve ; they declare sufficiently that they dare concur to the contrarie, viz. to disapprove, which is to make themselves the supreme Judges of Supremacie ; but neither the one, nor the other is to bee required at their hands, or imposed upon their Conscience ; for their dutie is discreetly to leav that unto God, and to time to manifest, and in the mean time to do sincerely their dutie. But now, becaus they are out of the waie of dutie in all this, and prepossessed with an indiscreet judgment ; therefore they also misinterpret the taking of the Engagement, as if it should oblige their consciences to make a definition of things past, by waie of approbation ; whereas, by the verie Act by which it is enjoined, it is evident, that the purpose of taking it, is onely to look from the present state of affairs, forward, and not backward, to secure the publick Peace and safetie in time to com, by the present settlement, and not to oblige anie to trouble himself with things past : therefore herein also is no right of the judgment, either of discretion or of definition, for the conscionable and definitive judgment should have taught them, to look upon the sens of the Engagement, onely as it is a cleer dutie, so far as it is expressed in the words, declaring manifestly the purpose thereof, and not otherwise ; but they having engaged their thoughts by prejudice, in another waie of Judicature, have not at all regarded this Rule, but made a definition quite contrarie thereunto, to take themselves off from due respect and obedience to their Superiors, upon a pretence of their failing in the highest point of their dutie, which neither discretion, nor conscience will ever allow them to determine.



The Appendix concerning the *Cheshier* and
Lancashier-Minister's Plea for Non-
Subscribers.

THese are my thoughts of the doubts which you mention, to bee in the thoughts of your friends : one thing as an *Appendix* you add more, which as an *appendix* to all these foregoing discourses between you and mee, I shall further also consider : and therewith conclude all further conferences on this Subject, except you shall desire the continuance thereof.

Your words are these. *I finde (saie you) that the Treatise of the Lancashier-Ministers seems to bee of great weight and strength, with manie good men : If a cleer Answer could bee given, to what therein is most substantial, it would give great satisfaction.*

Truly I do confesse, that that Treatise hath a seeming strength in it; and I believ that it doth take much with manie good men, that are oft-times but weakly principled in these matters; but I must confesse, that to mee, that Treatise hath no weight nor strength at all; and because you laie it before mee, as a means to give great satisfaction, if there were a cleer Answer given to that, which therein is most substantial, I shall with as much brevite as I can, shew you wherein I finde it substantially weak.

First then, I shall offer to your consideration, whether at all, by all which they have said, anie of these grounds bee shaken, which I have insisted upon all along, to shew the conscionableness of taking the Engagement; to my understanding (I profess) I finde not that they have directly touched, or medled with anie of my grounds to anie purpose at all; for which cause, as I have no Engagement at all upon my spirit, to deal with their plea: so I think it neither needful, nor discretion in mee, to take the task of other men upon mee, who are better able to
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maintein their own positions then I am: therefore I shall saie nothing to the whole *Appendix* of their Treatise, which contain's the Answers which they give to the Arguments, which other defenders of the Engagement have brought for it; and the Replies which they make to the solutions of the doubts, which are alleged against it: wherein little or nothing is touched of that, which is my plea for it.

But secondly, if I were to deal upon som other account, with these Non-subscribers about their Plea, either in charitie to themselves, to set them right; or in compassion towards others, to undeceiv such as think their reasons weightie, I would saie nothing to their preliminarie discourses, from page the first till the tenth, for as I would have all men bee towards my self; so I would bee towards them in my thoughts; and consequently, I do charitably believ of them, that they have truly delivered not onely the *series* of their thoughts, concerning their own case and condition, in reference to the present and former estate of affairs; but also the motives which have conscionably induced them to publish the reasons of their dissatisfaction at the taking of the Engagement; nor would I set my self to observ narrowly the Method of their proceeding; but I would endeavor in simplicitie and truth, to examine and remove the grounds of their dissatisfaction, that their desires so far as they are truly christian, and equitable might bee fulfilled: and with these preliminarie dispositions of minde, on my part, I would first com to state the Question between mee and them, to know how innocent upon the whole matter, their plea for non-subscribing might bee found: and then in the second place, I would propose the Principles, and the manner of proceeding, by which wee might com to the decision, and determination of that Question. These things would bee requisite to handle the matter thoroughly with them: but to let you, or anie equitable reader understand, where the invaliditie of the substance of their plea doth lie, as to my conception; I shall not need to proceed by so manie

degrees; for one that is not preposseſſed, as the Plead-ers may bee, it will ſuffice to ſhew, what the full ſtrength of their whole plea is, as they propoſe it; and then where that ſtrength doth fail them to make out their main purpoſe.

Their main purpoſe is to ſhew, that to ſubſcribe the Engagement, is a thing inconſiſtent with a good Conſcience, and therefore ought not to bee preſſed upon them.

To make this appear, they do two things; Firſt, they conſtrue the Engagement, and declare the ſenſ, wherein they think it is to bee taken. Secondly, they allege the reaſons, for which they cannot take and ſubſcribe it, in that ſenſ and conſtruction: Now if it bee made evident, either that they wholly miſconſtrue the Engagement, and therefore ought not to take it in that ſenſ, wherein they declare They underſtand it; or that ſuppoſing their ſenſ in ſom reſpect to bee tolerable; yet that the main grounds of the Reaſons which they raiſe upon that ſenſ, will not reach to the proof of their concluſion; then I ſuppoſe, it will cleerly follow, that their whole diſcourſe is of no ſoliditie: not onely, becauſe they miſtake the whole caſe of Conſcience in reference to the Engagement; and ſo bring in all their reaſons upon a meer miſtake; but alſo, becauſe the grounds of their reaſons are not found to evince their purpoſe, although the caſe were not miſtated. Now to mee, both theſe waies the Treatiſe is unſatisfactorie; for I think it may bee made out very fully; that they not onely miſunderſtand the Engagement; but that their reaſons prove not what they intend, for ſo far as they miſunderſtand it not.

Firſt, I ſhall ſhew you where to mee their miſtake lies, in the ſenſ of the Engagement; and then where their main Reaſons are not found to oblige conſciences. Concerning the meaning of the Engagement, they firſt allege the words; and then complain of the generalitie and ambiguitie thereof; and laſtly, deliver the ſenſ, wherein they conceiv it ought to bee taken, by the opening of three things.

1. The Object
 2. The Matter
 3. The Form
- } of the Engagement.

By the object they understand a positive, and particular form of Government, erected in the Land, and invested in certain persons, expressed in these words. *The Commonwealth of England, as it is now established without a King and House of Lords.*

By the matter in the words, *I will be true and faithful*, they understand not a meer negative and passive cessation, and succumbencie; but a positive devotedness to obedience, and active diligence in doing things commanded; and a mainteining of the Government in being, against all competitors, especially against the excluded King, and House of Lords; and aversion from promoting anie other government while's this Engagement is in force.

By the Form of the Engagement, in the words, *I do declare and promise that I will*; they understand an obligation for time to come, indeterminately and without limitation; so that it is onely in the will of the engaged to, to determine the length of the duration of the Engagement.

That which they saie, concerning the matter and form of the Engagement, they stand not much upon; nor shall I think amiss of it, becaus in som respect, all may bee admitted; but the corner-stone of their future building, is that which they saie concerning the object, or the partie engaged to; which I do think, is a very gross mistake, as they have stated it. The words of the Engagement expressing the object, are well alleged, to bee *the Commonwealth of England as it is now established, without a King and House of Lords*; but the sens which they make of this Commonwealth, as thus established, that nothing els should bee meant by it, but a positive and particular form of Government lately erected, and invested in certain persons, is a cleer mistake of the whole foundation of their Plea, against the taking of the Engagement, and maketh all that is built thereupon to bee ruinous: and although they seem to allege som colorable reasons, why these words of the Engagement are

are to bee taken in this sens; yet if the grounds which they pretend to have, for that construction of the words of the Engagement bee rightly weighed, they will appear exceeding weak: and evidently contrarie to the minde of the autors of the Engagement, and their words in the expresse Declarations, directly relating to this matter, contrarie to the rational construction of the words of the Engagement, look't upon barely in themselves: and contrarie to the Rules of Christian equitie, and Ingenuitie, observable by good Subjects in a business of this nature.

First, by the Margin of their Plea, they intend to color their interpretation from the words of an Act, for a daie of humiliation, *April. 19. 1649.* and out of som other Acts indefinitely vouched; which intimate onely that, *there is a government now settled in the waie of a Common-wealth, or free-state:* I shall grant willingly, that these words are truly vouched; but from them I denie, that it can bee rightly inferred, that therefore the sole and main object of the Engagement is nothing elf but the Government, as it is erected, and invested in certain persons; for the settlement of a Government in the waie of a Common-wealth is a thing mainly distinct from that, which is meant properly by a Common-wealth; for such a settlement doth presuppose, that there is a Common-wealth in being: for how can a Government bee settled in a Nation after the waie of a Common-wealth, except you presuppose that Nation to have the being of a Common-wealth? that is, to bee a State free from servitude, to the dominion of one man's will, to bee a Common-wealth, therefore is somewhat antecedent, to the having of a Government settled in the waie of a Common-wealth.

But secondly, to put it out of all doubt, that this is the true meaning of the autors of the Engagement; I shall refer you, not to som Declarations of theirs, which speak collaterally, and by the by of this matter; as these pleaders do, to lead themselves and others into a mistake; but to the Declarations, wherein the autors of the Engagement speak to this matter of set purpose, which the *Lancaster*

such Ministers ought to have heeded; because, *Ignorantia legis neminem excusat*. There is then an Act, *Die Sabbathi 19. Maie, 1640.* whereof the title is this.

The Act declaring, and constituting the people of England, to be a Common-wealth and Free State; and the words thereof are these in the following Paragraphs.

Be it declared and enacted by this present Parliament, and the Autoritie of the same, that the people of England, and of all the Dominions and territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be, and are hereby constituted, made, and established, and confirmed to be a Common-wealth and free State.

This is the first part of the Act, by which wee see cleerly, as also by the title, that they mean properly, by the Common-wealth of England the People collectively taken in their National relation.

The second part of the Act followeth in these words. And shall from henceforth be governed as a Common-wealth, and free-State, by the supreme Autoritie of this Nation, the Representatives of the People in Parliament, and by such as they shall appoint, and constitute, as Officers and Ministers under them, for the good of the people; and that without anie King and House of Lords.

This is the whole Act, by which it is as cleer as the Sun at noon daie, that they take a Common-wealth originally, and properly to be antecedent to the Government established in it; and therefore that their meaning is, that the object of our fealtie should be directly, and properly the Common-wealth in this sense; and the Government reductively, as it is settled in a Common-wealthwaie, which they define to be in the supreme and subordinate Officers; the supreme to be Representatives of the People in Parliament, and the subordinate to be such, as they shall appoint and constitute under them, &c. whence to my understanding it followeth undeniably, as also from the title, by which the Parliament doth style it self, viz. the Parliament of the Common-wealth of England; that the direct, and principal object of Truth, and faithfulness set before us in the Engagement, is the being of a Common-wealth,

as in the Act it is explained and established, and that the collateral object of Truth and faithfulness depending hereupon and offered to us in the Engagement as subordinate therunto, is the manner of the establishment now in being, without a King and House of Lords; which is the Government in a Common-wealth-waile by Representatives in Parliament, and Officers appointed by them: and as for their expression of the matter; viz. That it is a *Government as it is now erected and invested in certain persons*, it tends evidently to corrupt the Reader's minde with a jealousy against the persons in place, as if they would exalt themselves by the Engagement to bee alone respected as the whole Common-wealth; which I am persuaded is far from their thought.

From all which appeareth, that they complain without cause of *Protean* ambiguity, and too great a Generallitie of the words of the Engagement: General and Ambiguous words are not all one thing: True Generals have as proper a sense in their Comprehensiveness, as particulars have in their Circumscription. But now (because men love to misconstrue) when to prevent mistakes, the words are explained in proper significant terms, in what sense they are to bee taken (as by the aforesaid Act is done) then to misinterpret them odiously against the sense of the Authors, is not well excusable in the Interpreters. As for Ambiguous words, they are properly such as may bear a different sense of things no waile agreeing in nature, nor any where explained, nor explainable by any rational construction made of them by other words whereunto they are joined; which also cannot bee said of the words of the Engagement, if onely lookt upon by themselves, in reference to the proposed scope of those that do impose the same. For no intelligent man, looking impartially upon these words, with a reference to the declared aim of those that impose the same can make rationally anie other construction thereof then this; That the object of his Truth and Faithfulness must bee first immediately and directly the Common-wealth of *England*; and then secondarily by waile
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of Reduction, and in order thereunto, the Establishment of this Common-wealth as now it stand's by the Government of Parliament, without a King and House of Lords; for all intelligent men, if they will bethink themselves, may know, that the word *Common-wealth* is taken sometimes for the Collective, sometimes for the Representative Bodie of a people; and that without all ambiguity; because these two Bodies are not in the nature of Humane societie of different kinds; but being from one Principle, and to one end, they are alwaies to bee understood joint in their existence, and by their natural properties complicated together; and yet they may bee conceived, and are sometimes offered to our thoughts as distinct in their order and notions: therefore when in the same speech both the notions are distinctly intimated and offered to our apprehension, and that in their due subordination, it is very irrational for anie man to reject that which is the first and Principal, and take hold onely of the second and subordinate. Now in the words of the Engagement both these Notions are offered as distinct, and in their natural order expressed; for the first and principal Notion; which is the collective Common-wealth, is made the immediate and direct object of our promise as it is distinguished from the other by the denomination of England, which signifie's the bodie of the Nation, as if it were said, *I shall bee true and faithful to the People of this Land in their free state and national relation to each other, for common welfare.* And then the second and subordinate Notion which is the Representative Common-wealth is made the reductive and mediate object of the Engagement; as it is distinguished from the former by the reduplicative expressions, *As it is now established:* and the explanatorie termes relating to this establishment, *without a King or House of Lords.* now to make the reduplicative matter of the Engagement to bee the sole object of the promise, when the direct matter is in express termes before mentioned, and to make the representative Common-wealth, the sole thing meant, when the collective or represented Common-wealth is not onlie presupposed in the nature

ture of the thing; but in exprefs words first mentioned, is to mee very irrational and far from ingenuitie, although there were none other exposition of the words else where exstant: but now when both the words in their frame and disposition lie so fair, and there is so clear an expression of them elsewhere; then to complain of so much ambiguity, and upon that complaint to arrest the sense so far; bewraile's a great deal of partialitie and forestalement in the mindes of those that so take it up.

Besides al this, another consideration doth offer it self which may discover the aim of the authors of the Engagement and their sense in imposing it, and will make anie impartial man, who can rationally construe men's actions as well as their words, perceiv, that the main object of the Engagement cannot bee meant the sole government as invested in certain persons; because the persons, who are said to bee the object of the Engagement, do all of them take the same Engagement themselves, and in the same sense wherein it is offered to others to bee taken: now to say that they in taking it make themselves the sole object of their Engagement, and do understand by the word *Common-wealth of England* nothing else but themselves, is to mee so absurd, that I cannot imagine it to be incident to men of ingenuitie; and so injurious to their publick professions (whereby they have declared so manie waies that their Engagements and undertakings are wholly for the People of the land collectively, as they are a Nation; to bee true and faithful to them and to their Libertie) that, for conscience sake, I dare not suspect them to mean otherwise then they profess. And if upon these grounds I am obliged rationally to beleiv that this is the main object of their taking the Engagement, I must also conclude that they intend others should take it in the same waile. And as for the establishment whereof they themselves are a part being taken not individually but in their state-relation, it is no absurditie that in order to the main object, their state-constitution should bee a secondarie object whereunto each of them should bee engaged: and in what sense they are engaged thereunto, it

is their meaning that all who take the Engagement should be analogically in like manner engaged. Now they cannot be otherwise engaged, to their own state-relation and constitution; but as they are members of the Nation, and so far as they understand that constitution to be subordinable to the good of the Common-wealth in a collective sense: therefore no bodie else can or ought to be otherwise engaged thereunto, but as they relate unto the Nation, and as the constitution of the government is in that subordination. And I am very confident that none of them will saie, nor anie that understand themselves will think otherwise. As for mine own part in all businesses of this Nature, which concern subjection and obedience unto Superior Powers; I conceive the Rules of Christian Equitie and Ingenuitie oblige mee not to interpret either the actions or the words of my superiors suspiciously in the affection of State-jealousies; but to make the best Construction of them which they possibly can in reason bear; the best use of them which I can according to my dutie intend: and answerable to this rule I have declared my sense of the Engagement, so far as I found in it a clear dutie; and my willingness to be true and faithful to that dutie. And this is the rule by which I conceive an ingenious Christian ought to interpret the purpose of the Engagement. Nor is it equitable in him to think that his Christian Rulers would desire anie thing more of him by it, then what this doth com to: therefore I trouble not my head with anie Political onstrutions, or conjectural events of my Superior's proceedings, to puzzle my self or others therewith; if I walk within mine own sphere of subjection by a clear rule, I shall be inclined to wish and hope that others may do so also within their sphere of superiority; but if they fail, I am not their Judge, I must leav them to God, and be sorrie for that which seem's to be their failing; and praise that if it be a fault, God would rectifie it. Thus you see, how to mee, their main and fundamental position, whereupon their whole plea is afterward grounded, is a meer mistake, and that a very grosse one: for they having thus misconstrued the object of the Engage-

ment; upon this mis-stated case they draw up their whole plea in two heads of arguments. whereof the first is taken from the questionableness of this object; the second from their obligation to their former Engagements. The plea taken from the questionableness of this object is from pag. 12 till 35 under two heads. The first is from the *Thesis*, and general position; That no man can warrantably oblige himself to be true and faithful to a power or state gotten and held unjustly, whether to afford it a permissive sufferance, or an active support: This is handled from pag. 12 til 19. The second is from the *Hypothesis* or particular Position that this present power to be engaged to, is both gotten and held unjustly: which they endeavor to make out in two respects; first in respect of the Government removed or dispossessed, which is insisted upon from pag. 19. til 26. Secondly in respect of that which is erected in stead thereof from pag. 26 till 35.

These are the heads of the first plea; the sum of all which com's to this; that seeing none ought to oblige himself to be true and faithful to a power which is unjustly gotten and held; ^a because none ought to partake of, ^b or abet with, ^c and co-operate in, other men's sins; but all ought rather, and especially Ministers, to oppose sin in all; ^d therefore none ought to oblige himself to be true and faithful to this present power; because this present power is unlawfully gotten by the dispossession and removing of the former Government ^e without law and right to do so ^f; and by the erection and investing of it self, ^g which is a power not known what it is, ^h nor where it is placed, ⁱ nor whence it com's ^j; and is short to any ordinarie use, ^k and manie waies injurious to the King, Prince, and Peers, and to their respective hereditarie dignities and powers, to the House of Lords, to the House of Commons, ^l to the People, and to the Laws of the Land ^k. Thus the first plea, supposing the object of the Engagement to be nothing else but the present powers, argue's against them.

Their second plea, relating to former Engagements hath two

a Pag. 12.

b Pag. 13, 14.

c Pag. 15

d Pag. 16, 17,

18, 19.

e Pag. 20, till

26.

f Pag. 26, 27,

28.

g Pag. 29.

h Pag. 30.

i Pag. 31, 32.

k Pag. 33, 34.

two branches in like manner; the one is from their preingagement, as Subjects, from pag. 35 till 43; the other from their preingagement by sacred oaths from pag. 43 till 57: the sum of all which com's to this; That the Engagement, whereof the present powers are the sole object of Truth and faithfulness; ought not to bee taken, because they are under a tie of subjection to powers Diametrically opposite to these ^l which are still in being; and not at all abolished, ^m neither by a judicial decree of the settled and supreme Autoritie, nor by anie forcible erection, ⁿ nor by God, ^o nor by the original constitution of the people, ^p nor by anie Laws or Statutes ^q: and because they are under sacred oaths, ^r which are diametrically opposite to the powers set up by the Engagement, and which continue still in force to oblige them as unrepealed and unrepealable ^s.

This is the whole strength of their plea: it run's all along upon this mistake, That the Engagement doth intend onely to oblige ~~us~~ to Certain Persons, who style themselves the Common-wealth, as it is now established without King and Lords, as they themselves cleerly say pag. 39, and taking this as granted, (which I have shewed to be contrarie to the manifest declaration whereby the Common-wealth is constituted, contrarie to the Rational sens of the words of the Engagement considered by themselves, and compared with that which the Autors thereof intend by their own taking of it; and contrarie to the equitie and Ingenuitie of Christian men requisite in business of this nature) they build a plausible, but unsound, plea against the Engagement, by contradicting the lawful standing of the present Government. But to overthrow their whole plea at one blow, by that Act which I have evidenced, to bee the true object of the Engagement; I shall argue thus. That Engagement which require's nothing else, but that everie one should bee true and faithful to the Freedom, and Common well-fare of the Nation; as these are now attainable by the establishment wherein it stand's, everie member of the Nation is bound to take; nor can anie preingagement whatsoever lawfully hinder anie from taking the same. But this present

l Pag. 35, 36.

m Pag. 37, 38.

n Pag. 39, 40.

o Pag. 41.

p Pag. 42.

q Pag. 43.

r Pag. 44 till

51

s Pag. 51, till

57

sent Engagement require's nothing els but this: therefore all are bound to take it; and there can bee no preengagement lawful to hinder the taking thereof; as for them, they wrest the sens of the Engagement to pick a quarrel against the Autors thereof, that they may bring in matters of fact, concerning the change of the Government odiously against them, and that they may take an opportunitie to interpret the circumstances of their proceedings in reference to the change, as inconsistent with known Laws, and former engagements; but I finding that the Engagement in the obvious and rational sens, wherein it becom's everie private man, and good Christian to reflect upon it, doth contain a cleer Dutie, which I am bound to close with; I give my assent freely to it without anie more ado; and although I am not ignorant, that the Engagement it self doth presuppose a change befallen to the State of the Nation; yet, becaus it doth expressly oblige mee to look upon the Commonwealth onely, as now settled; and in time to com, to perform a lawful dutie towards it, therefore I am not obliged to ravel into former matters, which were antecedent to the change, to examine what hath been don to bring it about, and whether it is com to pass warrantably, or unwarrantably: for I finde not that God doth binde the decision of that matter, to determine the lawfulness or unlawfulness thereof, upon the Conscience of anie private man, such as I am, nor will hee have mee to suspend a dutie, which is necessarie *in presenti*, upon the disquirie of such disputable matters; therefore when these pleaders oblige everie private man, to ravel into matters of fact past, and to intangle their Consciences into the Judicature of the causes of the change, before they will suffer them to engage, to bee true and faithfull to the Commonwealth as now it standeth, they take tacitely for granted, that which by no means is to bee yielded; and which I in my first considerations have cleerly denied, and proved not to bee warrantable, *viz.* that everie private man may conscionably take upon him, to bee a Judg of the right,

or wrong management of publick affairs; here then is another great weaknes of the plea; that before they either make it out, or attempt to shew it lawfull for private men to becom Judges of the causes of publick changes, so as to make that Judicature a matter of Conscience to themselves, they actually undertake upon a conscientious account that judicature, & impose it upon the consciences of their unwarie Readers, definitively to bee look't into; and in effect ground all the reasons of their plea upon this bottom, (which they have no right to determine) viz. that the change of Government hath not been lawfully brought about; and consequently, that the present powers have no right to their places; and consequently, that it is a sin against the Conscience of good subjects, and Christian Covenanters to promise (at the requiring of the present Powers) to bee true and faithful in time to com, to the Common-welfare of the people of the Land, as it is attainable by the present constitution, which is without a King and House of Lords. Now although I should suppose (for argument's sake) their premises, that the change which hath befallen to the government of this Nation, was not lawfully brought about, as to the manner of proceeding therein; yet if I bee lawfully convicted, that it is beyond my sphere, to take upon mee the Judicature of that unlawfulness; and if it bee made probable unto mee by all the former proceedings of Parliament, that for the safetie of the Nation, there was a necessitie of some change of Government; and that the King could not stand in the possession of that Power, which hee was formerly intrusted withal: and if I can conceiv, that when swords are drawn, positive Laws are silent, and when those which manage the Supremacie of power are at variance amongst themselves, about the fundamentals of their settlement, that then opposite parties in power can act for their own, or the publick safetie, none otherwise, but according to emergencies, and that private men, as good Subjects and Christians ought to *acquiesce*, and make the best use they can of the result of those emergencies;

If (I saie) I am thus principled (and that I ought to bee thus principled in my station, they cannot denie) then it will cleerly follow to my Conscience, that however the change doth fall out, and in whose hand soever the power doth remain, I am not to make a new quarrel with them for it; nor to binde over my Conscience, to call them to an account of their former transactions about it, to get it in their hand, nor to refuse them that are in place my concurrence towards the procurement of the Common-welfare so far, as it may bee attainable under their Government, by good and lawful waies; which is the cleer case of the present Engagement to my understanding. And if upon the general matter of fact thus stated (which I suppose will not bee denied) and my conscience thus principled (which I suppose will not bee condemned, and I am sure is not convinced, by anie thing which they saie) they tell mee of particular irregularities in former proceedings, and argue from thence as they do; to conclude, that I ought not for the time to com, to concur with the present powers, in the tenor of the Engagement, though I finde in it a cleer dutie, will not I justly (though I might grant them all their premises) denie their consequence? I shall therefore saie, that although they are incompetent Judges of matters of fact; and have no right to sentence the present powers to bee without right to their places; yet granting that contrarie to positive Laws, and Contracts settled in former times, between the parties then in power, a change is fallen out in the Government, and the powers, upon the change are now altered; (I saie) granting all this, yet it will not follow, that I am bound in Conscience, either to refuse the taking of the Engagement, as it is tendered, or to oppose the present Government, which are the two main things they drive at; but you may see how weakly to a judicious Conscience thus principled. Thus then, over and above the grand mistake of the object of the Engagement, you see here again, is a main flaw in the ground of their reasoning, although there had been no such mistake, and although all the mat-

ters of fact which they allege, should bee granted unto them. For let past-matters of fact bee what they will, if it cannot bee made out, that private men, in places of subjection, are obliged in Conscience, to judg definitively of the supreme proceedings of their supreme Rulers; then it cannot also bee warrantable, either for them to take those matters of fact, upon which they ground their Arguments, judicially into their consideration, as they do, in reference to Conscience; or for mee upon their suggestion to define the same in that same relation, and if this cannot bee don warrantably, either by them, or mee, in respect of things past, but I am bound to look onely to that which is at present, and in time to com, my dutie in my place of Subjection: then all the presupposals upon which they draw inferences, to make good their conclusion, have no argumentative strength at all; but are wholly taken off, and made inconsiderable, as to my Conscience.

And if it bee objected here, but how can you dispense with your self, from looking judiciously into matters of fact, of a publick nature; Seeing your former oaths and Engagements have obliged you, to have a respect thereunto, and to become concurrent, to maintein the former settlement? I answer, that the former oaths could not binde mee, to have a respect, or to bee concurrent towards the former settlement, further then my place, and the station of a private man doth allow mee to meddle therein; now that place and station did allow mee, both then, and now, no more but the use of my judgment of discretion, to look upon the changes of publick affairs so, as might bee most advantagious for mee, to manage mine own resolutions towards a concurrence, in that which might tend most to the publick good in my waie; therefore I took all the Engagements as thus meant; nor is it lawful for anie, to tender anie Engagement unto mee upon anie other terms. Thus then I have still a respect to matters of fact in publick, in my place, by the judgment of discretion, to maintein the settlement which is, as formerly, before the change, I had to maintein the settlement which then was, so long

as it was in being: but since, without anie concurrence of mine (who was never called to manage a publick trust) the change is fallen out, by the management of those who were in trust, and a new settlement is erected, and an Engagement proposed unto mee, to bee true and faithful to the Common-wealth under it; I finde my self bound in Conscience to take that Engagement, without scrupling, or questioning the title of the power, to the place of Supremacie, wherein I finde them, or without calling them, or others to an account, of the causes of the change; I finde these things without my line, and am not warranted to meddle definitively with them; and if the *Cheshier* and *Lancashier*-Brethren had seriously resolved upon this matter, I suppose, they needed not to have troubled themselves, or others with their plea for Non-subscribers, whereof, perhaps it will bee needless, to shew you anie further my sens of it's fundamental weakness. But yet to go one step further, let us suppose, that som of your friends, whom their plea hath mainly prepossessed, will still scruple, and stick at the plausibleness of their fundamental Argument, as it may bee taken, with som advantage above what the pleaders themselves have said, from that which I seem to yield: *viz.* that the Government is som part of the object of the Engagement, whence their scruple may rise thus: if you grant, that this Government is som part of the object, whereunto wee are to engage, to bee true and faithful; and if it doth appear unto us to bee unjust, unwarranted and oppressive, in regard of the attainment and continued possession; then wee cannot with a good conscience subscribe to bee true and faithful to it; but you grant that the Government is som part of the object, whereunto wee are to engage, to bee true and faithful, and it doth appear to us to bee unjust, unwarranted, and oppressive, &c. therefore wee cannot with a good Conscience subscribe unto it.

To this there is a twofold Answer. First, I grant not that the Government by it self, and solely considered, is offered to us in the Engagement; but as it is reductive to,
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and complicated with, the main and direct object of our truth, and faithfulness, which is the Common-wealth of England: therefore our Truth and faithfulness is understood to bee engaged to it, as it is reasonable and subservient to the Common-welfare of the people of this Land. Secondly, I have shewed, that you as private men and Subjects, are not to take upon you the Judicature of the just, or unjust attieiment, and possession of Supremacie of power in your Superiors: but you are to look onely upon the dutie, which is due to them from you, as you are under them, and they undoubtedly in supreme power; if you trouble your Conscience with more then this; you are out of your line, and in a snare, and therefore ought to free your Conscience from the entanglement thereof: nay, although you should not, nor could not, bee otherwise persuaded, but that those who are in supreme power over you had both gotten, and do hold unjustly their power; yet except you could shew, that the Engagement by obliging you, to bee true and faithful to them, doth intend to engage you to bee so to them, in the waie and courf of their injustice, you have no just ground to scruple the taking of the Engagement; for the pleaders themselvs in page 12. confess, *that men lawfully may promise to bee true and faithful to an unjust partie, and person, in that which is just and right*; If then the Engagement doth intend to require nothing of you, but what is just and right, then, although you cannot laie down the scruple of their unjust acquisition, and possession of power, yet you may for ought that the pleaders have shewed to the contrarie, take the Engagement; for the pleaders have not at all proved, nor ever attempted, to prove, that the Engagement doth intend, to oblige us to powers which are unjust, in the waie and courf of their injustice, to bee true and faithful to them; but this they take up *gratis* as a thing granted, though it is not granted, but strongly denied; and so they beg the Question in this business also, which is the fundamental weakness of their plea; as for mine own part, I am cleer in that which for-

merly hath been said, concerning the object of the Engagement, in the sense which the Act explains it, and besides, if we look upon the Act, by which the Engagement is enjoined to be taken, we shall finde in the Preface thereof the intent for which it is to be taken, to be none other but to prevent conspiracies, tumults, and wars against the present settlement, which is a thing absolutely just and lawful, to be required of Subjects by their Magistrates, and to be promised by Subjects unto their Magistrates. If then this is the professed and declared purpose of the Engagement, although it should be never so manifest, that they who are in places of power had gotten, and hold their places unjustly; yet if the Engagement doth oblige these that take it, to nothing but what is just, by the pleader's own confession it may be taken: therefore I suppose it is abundantly made out, that it obligeth the takers to nothing, but what is just, both in respect of the object, whereunto it engageth us, and in respect of the intent and purpose, for which it is enjoined to be taken.

The last matter of proof which they insist upon, from page 43. till 57. is a plausible allegation of the contradictoriness of former oaths, to the object of the present Engagement, as they deliver it, and of these oaths in force, to oblige to this present time. To make these oaths seem contradictorie to the Engagement, having alleged the words of them which mention an obligation to the King, and kinglie Government, and to the privileges of Parliament, they oppose a Common-wealth-State, and Government, without a King and House of Lords, and a Government solely, and onely established in a partie of the House of Commons, and then to make them seem still obligatorie; they allege first, the provision of Duration made by the oaths themselves. Secondly, that the waies and means by which oaths are repealable, and may be annulled are not appliable to these; Thirdly, that the things sworn to, remain still lawful, and possible, and therefore the oaths still binding.

To these allegations, this is truly, advisedly, without respect of persons, and partial interells to bee said (as in page 46. they desire such as are not of a reprobate minde to judge,) that if the object which they put upon the Engagement, were such as they make it, then indeed there could bee no reconciling of these oaths with this Engagement; but becaul it is evident, that the object of the Engagement is not what they saie it is, but what wee have proved it to bee, *viz. the Common-welfare, and Freedom of the People of the Land, in their National association*; therefore there is no such contradiction, between the Engagement and the former oaths, as they represent: the difference is onely, that the former Engagements aiming at the same thing, which this doth aim at (*viz. the Common-welfare of the people of the Land,*) they mention the means then in being, by which that aim was to bee prosecuted by all men, in their severall places, and so oblige them to make use of them, and to uphold them, so long as it should bee possible, and lawful for them so to do; but this later Engagement doth mention the abolition, or non-existence of those means, and yet doth oblige to the full prosecution of the same aim; which to my understanding doth cleerly take away the contradiction: for I saie, except there bee shewed an opposition, in the intents and purposes of the former and later Engagements, there is no contradiction; but this cannot bee shewed, if the object of the later Engagement bee truly stated: for if it could not bee the meaning of the Laws, by which the former Engagements were established, to intend mainly anie other thing by those oaths, then that the Common-welfare of the people of the Land should bee upheld, by the means and waies mentioned therein; then there can bee no contradiction between them and this Engagement, which doth in express terms intend nothing else. But I suppose it is cleer to all, that the meaning of the Laws, by which these oaths were established, was none other. Therefore there can bee no contradiction between them and this Engagement; for although they mention not the Common-wealth

mon-wealth by name, yet it is cleer, that all those sanctions being made for the Common-welfare of the people, they presuppose in them, that which in this, is directly and mainly expressed. So then there is a difference in the expression of the main intent of the Engagement; but no contrarietie in the main aim: indeed, the means and waies to prosecute that main intent are opposite, becaus they are in their nature, according to emergencies alterable, and that which formerly was a means, is now none; but when in one Engagement I oblige my self, to prosecute the welfare of the Communalitie by that means which then could reach it, when I took the Engagement, and afterward by another Engagement I oblige my self to prosecute the same welfare of the Communalitie, without that means, becaus then it cannot reach it, when I take the second Engagement; I saie (advisedly, without respect of persons, and partial interests, as one speaking in the sight of God) that I do not understand, that in so doing I contradict my self: but being consonant to my first aim, I differ onely in the waie of following it, which according to emergencies in all humane affairs I am bound to do. And if anie, in humane affairs, will not walk by this Rule; but think's that humane Engagements, and his obligation to circumstantial matters and means, must make these unalterable, whether they relate anie more unto the main end for which hee was obliged to maintein them yea or no, hee is extremely mistaken in my judgment, and not knowing the nature of such ingagements, and the ground upon which they are to bee entred into, bring's himself into a snare, and forfeit's the right use of his Rational and Christian Libertie: whereof this is one part, that our conscience and affections cannot bee anie longer obliged to our own resolutions and undertakings, though never so strongly settled upon us; then those resolutions and undertakings are lawful and possible: now no resolutions and undertakings of ours are to bee counted lawful anie longer then they are proportionate and sutable to their true and natural ends: nor are they to bee counted possible unto us

to bee prosecuted by us, when all the means thereof, within the waile of our calling and station fail us. If these Rules of proceeding in the affairs of this nature bee sound and solid, then trie the non-subscriber's plea by them : and tell mee then what strength you finde therein to make out a real contradiction between the former and the later Engagement ; a seeming contradiction in the words and expressions is not denied ; but whether there bee any real opposition in the main aims thereof, for which the Engagements are conscionably offered and taken , that is to bee proved ; and because your non-subscribers plea com's not at all up to this ; therefore it is also herein very weak, which yet is the strongest and most plausible scruple which I finde in it.

As for the continued obligation of former oaths , if the main intent thereof, bee in the sens of the Law, which imposed them , the same with the main intent of this present Engagement, then there is no doubt, but they are still obliging, as to their aim, and to the realitie of our purpose, to prosecute that aim ; but if the means and waies of prosecuting that aim, in the sens of the Law, and of the Law-making power , which obliged our resolutions to make use of them, bee altered , and that in the present emergencies of affairs , it is neither possible nor lawful for us to prosecute that aim anie longer, by those means and waies in our station ; then I suppose it will bee granted, that the former Engagements in this respect are not onely repealable, but repealed and annulled, as to us. For although the oaths themselves make a provision for their perpetual duration , yet that cannot bee understood absolutely , or further then of our intention , that wee shall not take up a resolution to alter 'them ; but that wee shall persevere faithful thereunto, so long as the things sworn to shall have a real beeing ; but our provisional oath of the duration of our endeavors , to bee true and faithful to a thing, cannot oblige us beyond the realitie of the beeing thereof : therefore when wee saie, that wee shall all our life maintein the King's just Autoritie, and the Privileges of Parliament,

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and the Rights annexed to the Imperial Crown, &c. and that no fear, nor terror, nor anie earthlie thing shall make us alter this resolution; this is certainly to bee understood, with this supposal, that the things remaining so as they are, wee shall bee so towards them as wee promise; that is, wee shall endeavor to maintein them, and that no fear nor danger shall caus us to alter that resolution; but in case the King's Autoritie should cease to bee, or cease to bee just, or in case that state of Parliament-Privileges should come to bee utterly abolished, and the rights annexed to the Imperial Crown made wholly void, then I suppose it is not understood, that I am (notwithstanding such emergencies) obliged to maintein them, and that without anie respect to Common welfare, and without anie respect to the lawfulness and possibilitie of the prosecution thereof, in my place and calling; and if it bee considered, that in extraordinarie emergencies in a state, no positive Constitutions, Laws, and rights are able to keep up the establishment settled upon them; but that in such cases, all men must flie to the fundamentals of the universal law of nature, to do that, which by it's tenor is most warrantable, and expedient for common safetie, and consequently, that in such cases, all circumstances of former Engagements being altered, nothing but the main end, and the main Principles of common safetie and societie, will hold out, and bee obliging: if (I saie) this bee considered in these, and then in *Hypothesi* applied to our present affairs, and the changes under which God hath brought us, I conceive it will bee evident enough to perceiv, that the oaths which formerly (as matters then stood between us, as private men, and our Superiors) were lawful, are not now at all in force, as matters now stand between us, as private men, and the superior powers which are over us; if therefore the Brethren that make this plea, for the continued force of former oaths, in respect of circumstantialls, to bee obliging to the consciences of private men, would have dealt with us convincingly, and strongly, they should have made it out unto us, either in *thesi*, that notwithstanding all possible

possible emergencies, such oaths, are still in all respects to bee obliging; or in *Hypothesis*, that now to us, in this change of State-affairs no such emergencies are fallen out, as are valid, to take off the former circumstantial parts of our obligation; but becaus I finde no such thing proved, nor attempted to bee proved, therefore their plea to mee is weak in this respect also.

These are all the pillars upon which that building of theirs doth stand, which having so weak and sandie foundations, as I have discovered them to have, will fall to the ground, in the thoughts of such, as without prejudice will search into these matters. The particulars need not further to bee insisted upon: becaus they are matters of fact, and of positive Law, which I make not my work to dive into, so as to build anie conscientious judgment of doubtful matters thereupon, in these emergencies to steer my courf by. And becaus the chief things therein considerable, which relate unto Conscience, are either fully resolved in other Treatises, and particularly in the *Memorandums* of the conferences, which lately I sent unto you; or will receiv a more particular cleering from som papers, which I have in a readines, to bee made communicable unto you, and others, who stagger in their waie, and stumble at these stumbling stones, I shall continue to praie unto the Lord, that wee may all bee more and more enlightened, and directed to impart the light, which wee have received in the spirit of meekness, and love one to another, without anie other end or design, then our mutual edification in Righteousness, to the glorie of our God in Jesus Chrtst, in whom I am truly for the Gospel of Peace sake

St James's this
20. Sept. 1650.

Your unfeignedly affectionate
Brother and servant.

JOHN DURIE.

Worthie Sir!

I Received the books you sent, and return you manie thanks; I must needs acknowledg, that I cannot sufficiently express, how much I am obliged unto you, that are pleased to shew so great respect to mee, a stranger to you, and such as by no interest of desert can claim the least respect from you. Give mee leav to provoke you to pursue your intentions, of giving an answer to Lancashier-Minist'ers, and not to bee wearie of the work you have begun, in seeking to give satisfaction to the consciences of such, as are truly tender, and are kept off from engaging, by nothing, but onely by fear of offending God; what you have already don in these two last pieces, I doubt not but will give eal to manie that have been pained, and what you intend to do, will give further help in this kinde. If your pains should not have that success, and respect with men, as they deserv; yet that God who seeth the privacy of your heart, and the integritie of your intentions, will not let you go unrewarded; but when that promise of blestness pronounced to Peace-makers com's to bee fulfilled, you shall then have the full fruit of all your labors. Our good God assist you, and give you happie success in all your undertakings, and make this end and purpose; to his mercie I resign you, and rest

The 19th of Octob:
1650.

Your most obliged friend
and faithful Brother
in Christ.

ERRATA.

The greater faults.

Page 17. line ult. for ym read my, page 21. l. 17. for follow, r. follow; p. 25. l. 1. in these, r. in these. p. 34. l. 20. 21. r. Rule is given; p. 35. l. 27. I grant that; r. grant the. p. 39. l. 9. f. will make, r. will not make. p. 81. l. 13. 24. 25. r. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

The lesser.

In the title for occasionally, read occasionally. p. 11. l. 13. f. implore; r. impite; p. 21. l. 28. f. prudentially, r. providentially. p. 46. l. 11. f. step, r. stop. p. 66. l. 3. f. common; r. common. p. 93. l. 20. f. erection, r. edition.

FINIS.